Hyperproperties by Clarkson, Michael R. & Schneider, Fred B.
Hyperproperties
Michael R. Clarkson Fred B. Schneider
fclarkson,fbsg@cs.cornell.edu
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
Computing and Information Science Technical Report
http://hdl.handle.net/1813/11660
June 30, 2009Hyperproperties
Michael R. Clarkson Fred B. Schneider
fclarkson,fbsg@cs.cornell.edu




Trace properties, which have long been used for reasoning about systems, are
sets of execution traces. Hyperproperties, introduced here, are sets of trace prop-
erties. Hyperproperties can express security policies, such as secure information
ﬂow and service level agreements, that trace properties cannot. Safety and liveness
are generalized to hyperproperties, and every hyperproperty is shown to be the in-
tersection of a safety hyperproperty and a liveness hyperproperty. A veriﬁcation
technique for safety hyperproperties is given and is shown to generalize prior tech-
niques for verifying secure information ﬂow. Reﬁnement is shown to be applicable
with safety hyperproperties. A topological characterization of hyperproperties is
given.
1 Introduction
Important security policies cannot be expressed as properties of individual execution
traces of a system [2, 41, 63, 61, 22, 51, 59]. For example, noninterference [23] is
a conﬁdentiality policy that stipulates commands executed on behalf of users holding
high clearances have no effect on system behavior observed by users holding low clear-
ances. It is not a property of individual traces, because whether a trace is allowed by
the policy depends on whether another trace (obtained by deleting command execu-
tions by high users) is also allowed. For another example, stipulating a bound on mean
response time over all executions is an availability policy that cannot be speciﬁed as a
property of individual traces, because the acceptability of delays in a trace depends on
the magnitude of delays in all other traces. However, both example policies are prop-
erties of systems, because a system (viewed as a whole, not as individual executions)
either does or does not satisfy each policy.
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1A property either holds or does not hold (i.e., is a Boolean function) of an object,
and the extension of a property is the set of objects for which the property holds. The
extension of a property of individual traces—that is, a set of traces—sometimes is
termed “property,” too [34, 4]. But for clarity, we write trace property here to denote a
set of traces.
The theory of trace properties is well understood [36, 53, 35]. Every trace property
is the intersection of a safety property and a liveness property, where
 a safety property is a trace property that proscribes “bad things” and can be
proved using an invariance argument, and
 a liveness property is a trace property that prescribes “good things” and can be
proved using a well-foundedness argument.1
This classiﬁcation forms an intuitively appealing basis from which all trace properties
can be constructed. Moreover, safety and liveness properties are afﬁliated with speciﬁc
veriﬁcation methods.
Ananalogoustheoryforsecuritypolicieswouldbeappealing. Thefactthatsecurity
policies, like trace properties, proscribe and prescribe behaviors of systems suggested
that such a theory might exist. This paper develops that theory by formalizing security
policies as properties of systems, or system properties.2 If systems are modeled as sets
of execution traces [34], then the extension of a system property is a set of sets of traces
or, equivalently, a set of trace properties. We name this type of set a hyperproperty.
Every property of system behavior (for systems modeled as trace sets) can be spec-
iﬁed as a hyperproperty, by deﬁnition. Thus, hyperproperties can describe trace prop-
erties and moreover can describe security policies, such as noninterference and mean
response time, that trace properties cannot. Deterministic, nondeterministic, proba-
bilistic, and transition-system models all can be encoded as trace sets and handled
using hyperproperties.
This paper shows that results similar to those from the theory of trace properties
hold for hyperproperties:
 Every hyperproperty is the intersection of a safety hyperproperty and a liveness
hyperproperty. (Henceforth, we shorten these terms to hypersafety and hyper-
liveness.) Hypersafety and hyperliveness thus form a basis from which all hy-
perproperties can be constructed.
 Hyperproperties from a particular class that we introduce, called k-safety, can
be veriﬁed by using invariance arguments. Our veriﬁcation methodology gen-
eralizes prior work on using invariance arguments to verify information-ﬂow
policies [8, 59].
1Lamport [32] gave the ﬁrst informal deﬁnitions for safety and liveness properties, appropriating the
names from Petri net theory, and he also gave the ﬁrst formal deﬁnition of safety [34]. Alpern and Schnei-
der [4] gave the ﬁrst formal deﬁnition of liveness and the proof that all trace properties are the intersection
of safety and liveness properties; they later established the correspondence of safety to invariance and of
liveness to well-foundedness [5].
2McLean [41] gave the ﬁrst formalization of security policies as properties of trace sets.
2However, we have not obtained complete veriﬁcation methods for hypersafety or for
hyperliveness.
The theory of hyperproperties also sheds light on the problematic status of reﬁne-
ment for security policies. Reﬁnement never invalidates a trace property but can inval-
idate a hyperproperty:
Consider a system  that nondeterministically chooses to output 0, 1, or
the value of a secret bit h. System  satisﬁes the security policy “The
possible output values are independent of the values of secrets.” But one
reﬁnement of  is the system that always outputs h, and this system does
not satisfy the security policy.
We characterize in this paper the entire set of hyperproperties for which reﬁnement is
valid; this set includes the safety hyperproperties.
Safety and liveness not only form a basis for trace properties and hyperproper-
ties, but they also have a surprisingly deep mathematical characterization in terms of
topology. In the Plotkin topology on trace properties, safety and liveness are known to
correspond to closed and dense sets, respectively [4]. We generalize this topological
characterization to hyperproperties, showing that hypersafety and hyperliveness also
correspond to closed and dense sets in a new topology, which turns out to be equivalent
to the lower Vietoris construction applied to the Plotkin topology [56]. This correspon-
dence could be used to bring results from topology to bear on hyperproperties.
We proceed as follows. Hyperproperties, hypersafety, k-safety, and hyperliveness
are deﬁned and explored in sections 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Section 6 gives a topo-
logical account of hyperproperties. Section 7 presents the hyperproperty intersection
theorem and discusses hyperproperties of system representations other than trace sets
(relational systems, labeled transition systems, state machines, and probabilistic sys-
tems). Section 8 concludes. Appendix A gives a guide to our notation, appendix B
presents formal details of our longer examples of hyperproperties, appendix C states
formal results about system representations, and all proofs appear in appendix D.
This paper revises and expands a CSF’08 paper [15], adding (i) new results about
system representations, and (ii) proofs, which were absent from the earlier paper. Sev-
eral of the proofs have been veriﬁed [12] using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [45].
2 Hyperproperties
We model system execution with traces, where a trace is a sequence of states; by
employing rich enough notions of state, this model can encode other representations of
executions.3 For example, section 7 discusses how to model a labeled transition system
as a set of traces by including transition labels in states, thereby preserving information
about the nondeterministic branching structure of the system. Section 7 also uses this
encoding to model state machines and probabilistic systems.
The structure of a state is not important in the following deﬁnitions, so we leave set
 of states abstract. However, the structure of a state is important for real examples,
3We have not investigated analogues to hyperproperties for representations of system execution that can-
not be encoded as trace sets.
3and we introduce predicates and functions, on states and on traces, as needed to model
events, timing, probability, etc.
Traces may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequences, which we categorize into sets:
	n , ;
	inf , !;
	 , 	n [ 	inf:
For trace t = s0s1 ::: and index i, we deﬁne the following indexing notation:
t[i] , si;
t[::i] , s0s1 :::si;
t[i::] , sisi+1 :::
We denote concatenation of ﬁnite trace t and (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) trace t0 as tt0, and we
denote the empty trace as .
A system is modeled by a non-empty set of inﬁnite traces, called its executions. If
an execution terminates (and thus could be represented by a ﬁnite trace), we represent
it as an inﬁnite trace by inﬁnitely stuttering the ﬁnal state in the ﬁnite trace.
2.1 Trace properties
A trace property is a set of inﬁnite traces. The set of all trace properties is
Prop , P(	inf);
where P denotes powerset. A set T of traces satisﬁes a trace property P, denoted
T j= P, iff all the traces of T are in P:
T j= P , T  P:
Some security policies are expressible as trace properties. For example, consider
the policy “The system may not write to the network after reading from a ﬁle.” For-
mally, this is the set of traces
NRW , ft 2 	inf j :(9i;j 2 N : i < j ^ isFileRead(t[i])
^ isNetworkWrite(t[j]))g; (2.1)
where isFileRead and isNetworkWrite are state predicates. Similarly, access control
is a trace property requiring every operation to be consistent with its requestor’s rights:
AC , ft 2 	inf j (8i 2 N : rightsReq(t[i])
 acm(t[i   1])[subj(t[i]);obj(t[i])])g: (2.2)
Functionacm(s)yieldstheaccesscontrolmatrixinstates. Functionsubj(s)yieldsthe
subject who requested the operation that led to state s, function obj(s) yields the object
4involvedinthatoperation, andfunctionrightsReq(s)yieldstheright(s)requiredforthe
operation to be allowed. As another example, guaranteed service is a trace property
requiring that every request for service is eventually satisﬁed:
GS , ft 2 	inf j (8i 2 N : isReq(t[i])
=) (9j > i : isRespToReq(t[j];t[i])))g: (2.3)
Predicate isReq(s) identiﬁes whether a request is initiated in state s, and predicate
isRespToReq(s0;s) identiﬁes whether state s0 completes the response to the request
initiated in state s.
2.2 Hyperproperties
A hyperproperty is a set of sets of inﬁnite traces, or equivalently a set of trace proper-
ties. The set of all hyperproperties is
HP , P(P(	inf))
= P(Prop):
The interpretation of a hyperproperty as a security policy is that the hyperproperty is
the set of systems allowed by that policy.4 Each trace property in a hyperproperty is an
allowed system, specifying exactly which executions must be possible for that system.
Thus a set T of traces satisﬁes hyperproperty H, denoted T j= H, iff T is in H:
T j= H , T 2 H:
Note the use of bold face to denote hyperproperties (e.g., H) and sets of hyperprop-
erties (e.g., HP). See Appendix A for a guide to other typographical conventions and
notation.
Given a trace property P, there is a unique hyperproperty denoted [P] that ex-
presses the same policy as P. We call this hyperproperty the lift of P. For P and [P]
to express the same policy, they must be satisﬁed by the same sets of traces. Thus we
can derive a deﬁnition of [P]:
(8T 2 Prop : T j= P () T j= [P])
= (8T 2 Prop : T  P () T 2 [P])
= [P] = fT 2 Prop j T  Pg
= [P] = P(P):
Consequently, the lift of P is the powerset of P:
[P] , P(P):
4The hyperproperty might also contain the empty set of traces, although this does not correspond to a
system.
52.3 Hyperproperties in Action
Trace properties are satisﬁed by traces, whereas hyperproperties are satisﬁed by sets of
traces. This additional level of sets means that hyperproperties can be more expressive
than trace properties. We explore this added expressivity with some examples.
Secure information ﬂow. Information-ﬂow security policies express restrictions on
what information may be learned by users of a system. Users interact with systems
by providing inputs and observing outputs. To model this interaction, deﬁne ev(s)
as the input or output event, if any, that occurs when a system transitions to state s.
Assume that at most one event, input or output, can occur at each transition. For a
trace t, extend this notation to ev(t), denoting the sequence of events resulting from
application of ev() to each state in trace t.5 Further assume that each user of a system
is cleared either at conﬁdentiality level L, representing low (public) information, or H,
representing high (secret) information, and that each event is labeled with one of these
conﬁdentiality levels. Deﬁne evL(t) to be the subsequence of low input and output
events contained within ev(t), and evHin(t) to be the subsequence of high input events
contained within ev(t).
Noninterference, asdeﬁnedbyGoguenandMeseguer[23], requiresthatcommands
issued by users holding high clearances be removable without affecting observations
of users holding low clearances. Treating commands as inputs and observations as
outputs, we model this security policy as a hyperproperty requiring a system to contain,
foranytracet, acorrespondingtracet0 withnohighinputsyetwiththesamelowevents
as t:
GMNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 SM
^ (8t 2 T : (9t0 2 T : evHin(t0) = 
^ evL(t) = evL(t0)))g: (2.4)
Conjunct T 2 SM expresses the requirement, made by Goguen and Meseguer’s for-
malization, that systems are deterministic state machines; section 7.2.3 deﬁnes SM
formally. GMNI is not a trace property, as argued in section 1, because trace t is
allowed only if corresponding trace t0 is also allowed.
Generalized noninterference [39] extends Goguen and Meseguer’s deﬁnition of
noninterference to handle nondeterministic systems, which are the systems T modeled
by Prop—hence we no longer have T 2 SM. McLean [41] reformulates generalized
noninterference as a policy requiring a system to contain, for any traces t1 and t2, an
interleaved trace t3 whose high inputs are the same as t1 and whose low events are the
same as t2. This is a hyperproperty:
GNI , fT 2 Prop j (8t1;t2 2 T : (9t3 2 T :
evHin(t3) = evHin(t1) ^ evL(t3) = evL(t2)))g: (2.5)
5Depending on the nature of events in the particular system that is being modeled, it might be appropriate
for ev(t) to eliminate stuttering of events.
6GNI is not a trace property because the presence of any two traces t1 and t2 in a system
necessitates the presence of a third trace t3.
Observational determinism [40, 50] requires a system to appear deterministic to a
low user. Zdancewic and Myers’s [64] deﬁnition of observational determinism can be
formulated as a hyperproperty:
OD , fT 2 Prop j (8t;t0 2 T : t[0] =L t0[0] =) t L t0)g: (2.6)
Note that this deﬁnition is based on states, not events. State equivalence relation
s =L s0 holds whenever states s and s0 are indistinguishable to a low user, and trace
equivalence relation t L t0 holds whenever traces t and t0 are indistinguishable to a
low user. Zdancewic and Myers deﬁne trace equivalence in terms of state equivalence,
requiring the sequence of states in each trace to be equivalent up to both stuttering and
preﬁx; equivalence up to preﬁx makes their deﬁnition termination insensitive—that is,
systems are allowed to leak information via termination channels.6 OD is not a trace
property because whether some trace is allowed in a system depends on all the other
traces of the system.
Bisimulation-based deﬁnitions of information-ﬂow security policies can also be
formulated as hyperproperties,7 which we demonstrate with Focardi and Gorrieri’s [22]
bisimulation nondeducibility on compositions (BNDC) in section 7.2.2, and with Bou-
dol and Castellani’s [11] deﬁnition of noninterference in appendix B.
All the information-ﬂow security policies we investigated turned out to be hyper-
properties, not trace properties. This is suggestive, but any stronger statement about
the connection between information ﬂow and hyperproperties would require a formal
deﬁnition of information-ﬂow policies, and none is universally accepted. Nonethe-
less, we believe that information ﬂow is intrinsically tied to correlations between (not
within) executions. And hyperproperties are sufﬁciently expressive to formulate such
correlations, whereas trace properties are not.
Service level agreements. A service level agreement (SLA) speciﬁes acceptable per-
formance of a system. Such speciﬁcations commonly use statistics such as
 mean response time, the (arithmetic) mean time that elapses between a request
and a response;
 time service factor, the percentage of requests that are serviced within a speciﬁed
time; and
 percentage uptime, the percentage of time during which the system is available
to accept and service requests.
6Zdancewic and Myers also require systems to be race free, hence they weaken trace equivalence to hold
for each memory location in a state in isolation, not over all memory locations simultaneously. We omit this
requirement for simplicity.
7Since hyperproperties are trace-based, this might at ﬁrst seem to contradict results, such as Focardi and
Gorrieri’s [22], stating that bisimulation-based deﬁnitions are more expressive than trace-based deﬁnitions.
However, by employing a richer notion of state [53, x1.3] in traces than Focardi and Gorrieri, our hyperprop-
erties are able to express bisimulations.
7These statistics can be used to deﬁne policies with respect to individual executions
of a system or across all executions of a system. In the former case, the SLA would be
a trace property. For example, the policy “The mean response time in each execution
is less than 1 second” might not be satisﬁed by a system if there are executions in
which some response times are much greater than 1 second. Yet if these executions
are rare, then the system might still satisfy the policy “The mean response time over
all executions is less than 1 second.” This latter SLA is not a trace property, but it is a
hyperproperty:







Function mean(X) denotes the mean8 of a set X of real numbers, and respTimes(t)
denotes the set of response times (in seconds) from request/response events in trace
t. Policies derived from the other SLA statistics above can similarly be expressed as
hyperproperties.
2.4 Beyond Hyperproperties?
Hyperproperties are able to express security policies that trace properties cannot. So it
is natural to ask whether there are security policies that hyperproperties cannot express.
In section 1, we equated security policies with system properties, and we chose to
model systems as trace sets. Every property of trace sets is a hyperproperty, so by deﬁ-
nition hyperproperties are expressively complete for our formulations of “system” and
“security policy.” Thus, to ﬁnd security policies that hyperproperties cannot express
(if any exist), we would need to examine alternative notions of systems and security
policies. Section 7 discusses alternative formulations of systems, but all the formula-
tions considered there turn out to have encodings as trace sets—thus hyperproperties
are complete for those formulations. We do not know whether other formulations exist
that do not have such encodings.
One way to generalize the notion of a security policy is to consider policies on sets
of systems—for example, diversity [49], which requires the systems all to implement
the same functionality but to differ in their implementation details. Any such policy,
however, could be modeled as a hyperproperty on a single system that is a product9 of
all the systems in the set. So hyperproperties again seem to be sufﬁcient.
2.5 Logic and Hyperproperties
We have not given a logic in which hyperproperties may be expressed. The examples
in this paper require only second-order logic. Although higher-order logic might also
8A simple way to ensure that mean(X) is well-deﬁned in RT is to deﬁne mean(X) to be 0 for any
inﬁnite X. This causes RT to ignore any system that processes an inﬁnite number of requests, which might
not be reasonable. We discuss a more reasonable, though complicated, deﬁnition of RT in section 5.
9The product of systems T1 and T2 is the system deﬁned as f(t1[0];t2[0])(t1[1];t1[2])::: j t1 2
T1 ^ t2 2 T2g, comprising traces over pairs of states. Generalizing, the product of a set of n systems
comprises traces over n-tuples of states.
8be useful to express hyperproperties, higher-order logic is reducible to second-order
logic [55, x6.2]. So we believe that second-order logic is sufﬁcient to express all hy-
perproperties. But we do not know whether the full power of second-order logic is
necessary to express hyperproperties of interest. This has ramiﬁcations for veriﬁcation
of hyperproperties, because although full second-order logic cannot be effectively and
completely axiomatized, fragments of it can be [9, x2.3].10
2.6 Reﬁnement and Hyperproperties
Programmers use stepwise reﬁnement [20, 62, 18, 7, 1, 35] to develop, in a series of
steps, a program that implements a speciﬁcation. The programmer starts from the
speciﬁcation. Each successive step creates a more concrete speciﬁcation, ultimately
culminating in a speciﬁcation that is sufﬁciently concrete such that a computer can ex-
ecute it. To prove that the ﬁnal concrete speciﬁcation correctly implements the original
speciﬁcation, the programmer argues at each step that the new concrete speciﬁcation
reﬁnes the previous speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcation S1 reﬁnes speciﬁcation S2, denoted
S1 REF S2, iff every behavior permitted by S1 is also permitted by S2—that is, the set
of behaviors of S1 is a subset of the set of behaviors of S2.
Speciﬁcations might describe behaviors at different levels of abstraction. For ex-
ample, a speciﬁcation might describe behaviors of a queue, but a reﬁnement of that
speciﬁcation might use an array to implement this behavior. Or a speciﬁcation might
describe behaviors using critical sections, but a reﬁnement might implement critical
sections with semaphores. So programmers need techniques to relate the behaviors de-
scribed by speciﬁcations. Abstraction functions [28, 27] and reﬁnement mappings [1]
have been developed for this purpose; both interpret concrete behaviors as abstract
behaviors.
Generalizing from these two techniques, let an interpretation function be a function
of type 	 ! 	. Let IF be any class of interpretation functions that (like abstraction
functions and reﬁnement mappings) is closed under composition and contains the iden-
tity function id.11 Given interpretation function , lift  to Prop ! Prop by applying
 to each trace in a set:
(T) , f(t) j t 2 Tg:
System S -satisﬁes trace property P, denoted S j= P, iff (S) j= P. Notation
S j= P, as we have used it so far, thus means that S j=id P.
Trace property P1 reﬁnes P2 under interpretation , denoted P1 REF P2, iff
(P1)  P2. So for trace properties, satisfaction is the same relation as reﬁnement,
and subset implies reﬁnement—that is, if C is a subset of A, then C reﬁnes A (under
interpretation id). This implication is desirable, because it permits reﬁnements that
10It is natural to ask whether we could further reduce second-order logic to ﬁrst-order. Such a reduction is
possible, but only with the Henkin, rather than standard, semantics of second-order logic [9, x4.2]. We do not
know which of these semantics should be preferred for hyperproperties. However, there are trace properties,
and thus hyperproperties, that we conjecture cannot be expressed in ﬁrst-order logic—for example, the trace
property containing the single trace pqppqqpppqqq :::, where p and q are states. This suggests that the
standard semantics is appropriate.
11Abstraction functions must also preserve data type operations, and reﬁnement mappings must also pre-
serve externally visible components up to stuttering. But these restrictions are not relevant to our discussion.
9resolve non-determinism by removing traces from a system. But it is well-known that
this kind of reﬁnement does not generally work for security policies.12 For example,
recall system  (section 1), which nondeterministically chooses to output 0, 1, or the
value of a secret bit h. System  satisﬁes the speciﬁcation “The possible output values
are independent of the values of secrets,” which can be formulated as a hyperproperty.
But consider a system 0 that always outputs h. System 0 does not satisfy the speciﬁ-
cation and therefore cannot reﬁne , yet 0  . So subset does not imply reﬁnement
for hyperproperties as it does for trace properties.
Hyperproperty H1 reﬁnes H2 under interpretation , denoted H1 HREF H2, iff
(H1)  H2, where (H) is deﬁned as f(T) j T 2 Hg. A natural relationship that
we would expect to hold is
(8S 2 Prop;H 2 HP : S j= H () [S] HREFid H); (2.8)
because satisfaction and reﬁnement intuitively should coincide (as they did for trace
properties). Straightforward application of deﬁnitions then shows that (2.8) holds iff
H is subset closed.
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, the set of hyperproperties with which reﬁnement
works is the set SSC of subset-closed hyperproperties:
SSC , fH 2 HP j (8T 2 Prop : T 2 H
=) (8T0 2 Prop : T0  T =) T0 2 H))g:
The lifted trace properties are, of course, members of SSC. But SSC contains more
than just the lifted trace properties. For example, observational determinism OD (2.6)
is subset closed and therefore a member of SSC, but OD is not a lifted trace property.
3 Hypersafety
According to Alpern and Schneider [4], the “bad thing” in a safety property must be
both
 ﬁnitely observable, meaning its occurrence can be detected in ﬁnite time, and
 irremediable, so its occurrence can never be remediated by future events.
No-read-then-write NRW (2.1) and access control AC (2.2) are both safety. The bad
thing for NRW is a ﬁnite trace in which a network write occurs after a ﬁle read. This
bad thing is ﬁnitely observable, because the write can be detected in some ﬁnite preﬁx
of the trace, and irremediable, because the network write can never be undone. For
AC, the bad thing is similarly a ﬁnite trace in which an operation is performed without
appropriate rights.
For trace properties, a bad thing is a ﬁnite trace that cannot be a preﬁx of any
execution satisfying the safety property. A ﬁnite trace t is a preﬁx of a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite)
trace t0, denoted t  t0, iff t0 = tt00 for some t00 2 	.
12Previous work has identiﬁed reﬁnement techniques that are valid for use with certain information-ﬂow
security policies [41, 38, 10].
10Safety property. A trace property S is a safety property [4] iff
(8t 2 	inf : t = 2 S =) (9m 2 	n : m  t ^
(8t0 2 	inf : m  t0 =) t0 = 2 S))):
Deﬁne SP to be the set of all safety properties; note that SP is itself a hyperproperty.
We generalize safety to hypersafety by generalizing the bad thing from a ﬁnite trace
to a ﬁnite13 set of ﬁnite traces. Deﬁne Obs to be the set of such observations:
Obs , Pn(	n);
where Pn(X) denotes the set of all ﬁnite subsets of set X. Preﬁx  on sets of traces
is deﬁned as follows:14
T  T0 , (8t 2 T : (9t0 2 T0 : t  t0)):
Note that this deﬁnition allows T0 to contain new traces that have no preﬁx in T.
Safety hyperproperty. A hyperproperty S is a safety hyperproperty (is hyper-
safety) iff
(8T 2 Prop : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 S))):
The deﬁnition of hypersafety parallels the deﬁnition of safety, but the domains involved
nowincludeanextralevelofsets. DeﬁneSHPtobethesetofallsafetyhyperproperties.
Some consequences of the deﬁnition of hypersafety are:
 Observational determinism OD (2.6) is hypersafety. The bad thing is a pair of
traces that are not low-equivalent despite having low-equivalent initial states.
 Safety properties lift to safety hyperproperties.
Proposition 1. (8S 2 Prop : S 2 SP () [S] 2 SHP)
 Set SP of all safety properties is not a safety hyperproperty: there is no bad thing
that prevents an arbitrary trace property from being extended to a safety property.
Reﬁnement of hypersafety. Stepwise reﬁnement works with all safety hyperproper-
ties, because safety hyperproperties are subset closed (c.f. section 2.6), as stated by the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. SHP  SSC
13Inﬁnite sets might seem to be an attractive alternative, and many of the results in the rest of this paper
would still hold. However, the topological characterization given in section 6 (speciﬁcally, Propositions 4
and 5) would be sacriﬁced.
14Other deﬁnitions of trace set preﬁx are possible, but inconsistent with our notion of observation. We
discuss this in section 6.
11A consequence of Theorem 1 is that any hyperproperty that is not subset closed
cannot be hypersafety. For example, generalized noninterference GNI (2.5) is not
subset closed: a system containing traces t1 and t2 and interleaved trace t3 might
satisfy GNI, but the subset containing only t1 and t2 would not satisfy GNI. Thus
GNI cannot be hypersafety.
4 Beyond 2-Safety
Safety properties enjoy a relatively complete veriﬁcation methodology based on in-
variance arguments [5]. Although we have not obtained such a methodology for hyper-
safety, we can use invariance arguments to verify a class of safety hyperproperties by
generalizing recent work on veriﬁcation of secure information ﬂow.
Recall that secure information ﬂow is a hyperproperty but not a trace property. Re-
cent work gives system transformations that reduce verifying secure information ﬂow15
to verifying a safety property of some transformed system: Pottier and Simonet [48]
develop a type system for verifying secure information ﬂow based on simultaneous
reasoning about two executions of a program. Darvas et al. [19] show that secure in-
formation ﬂow can be expressed in dynamic logic. Barthe et al. [8] give an equivalent
formulation for Hoare logic and temporal logic, based on a self-composition construc-
tion.
Deﬁnethesequentialself-compositionofP astheprogramP;P0, whereP0 denotes
program P, but with every variable renamed to a fresh, primed variable—for example,
variable x is renamed to x0. Then, one way to verify that P exhibits secure information
ﬂow is to establish the following trace property of transformed program P;P0:
If for every low variable l, before execution l = l0 holds, then when ex-
ecution terminates l = l0 still holds, no matter what the values of high
variables were.
Barthe et al. generalize the self-composition operator from ; to any operator that sat-
isﬁes certain conditions, and they note that parallel composition satisﬁes these condi-
tions. They also relax the equality constraints in the above trace property to partial
equivalence relations, obtaining a generalization of relational noninterference. Ter-
auchi and Aiken [59] further generalize the applicability of self-composition by show-
ing that it can be used to verify any 2-safety property, which they deﬁne informally as
a “property that can be refuted by observing two ﬁnite traces.”
Using hyperproperties, we can show that the above results are special cases of a
more general theorem. Deﬁne a k-safety hyperproperty as a safety hyperproperty in
which the bad thing never involves more than k traces.
k-safety hyperproperty. A hyperproperty S is a k-safety hyperproperty (is k-
15These reductions are possible because the particular formulations of secure information ﬂow used in
each work are actually hypersafety. A formulation that is hyperliveness—which would include all possibilis-
tic information-ﬂow policies, as discussed in section 5—would not be amenable to these reductions.
12safety) iff
(8T 2 Prop : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ jMj  k
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 S))):
This is just the deﬁnition of hypersafety with an added conjunct “jMj  k”. Given a
particular k, deﬁne KSHP(k) to be the set of all k-safety hyperproperties.
As an example of a k-safety hyperproperty for any k, consider a system that stores
a secret by splitting it into k shares. Suppose that an action of the system is to output
a share. Then a hyperproperty of interest might be that the system cannot, across all
of its executions, output all k shares (thereby outputting sufﬁcient information for the
secret to be reconstructed). We denote this k-safety hyperproperty as SecSk.
Note that the 1-safety hyperproperties are the lifted safety properties—that is,
KSHP(1) = f[S] j S 2 SPg
—since the bad thing for a safety property is a single trace. Thus “1-safety” and
“safety” are synonymous.
The Terauchi and Aiken deﬁnition of 2-safety properties is limited to deterministic
programs expressed in a relational model of execution (which we address further in
section 7.2.1), and it ignores nonterminating traces. So their 2-safety properties are
a strict subset of our 2-safety hyperproperties KSHP(2). For example, observational
determinism OD (2.6) cannot be expressed as a 2-safety property, but it is a 2-safety
hyperproperty.
Deﬁne the parallel self-composition of system S as the product system S  S con-
sisting of traces over   :
S  S , f(t[0];t0[0])(t[1];t0[1]) j t 2 S ^ t0 2 Sg:
Deﬁne the k-product of S, denoted Sk, to be the k-fold parallel self-composition of S,
comprising traces over k. Self-composition S  S is equivalent to 2-product S2.
Previous work has shown how to reduce a particular formulation of noninterference
of S to a related safety property of S2 [8], and how to reduce any 2-safety hyperpro-
perty of system S to a related safety property of S;S0 [59]. The following theorem
generalizes those results: for any system S, any k-safety hyperproperty K of S can be
reduced to a safety property K of Sk, and the proof of the theorem (in appendix D)
shows how to construct K from K. Let Sys be the set of all systems.
Theorem 2. (8S 2 Sys;K 2 KSHP(k) : (9K 2 SP : S j= K () Sk j= K))
Theorem 2 provides a veriﬁcation technique for k-safety: reduce a k-safety hyper-
property to a safety property, then verify that the safety property is satisﬁed by Sk using
an invariance argument. Since invariance arguments are relatively complete for safety
properties [5], this methodology is relatively complete for k-safety.
However, Theorem 2 does not provide the relatively complete veriﬁcation proce-
dure we seek for hypersafety, because there are safety hyperproperties that are not k-
safety for any k. For example, consider the hyperproperty “for any k, a system cannot





This is not k-safety for any k. Yet it is hypersafety, since any trace property not con-
tained in it violates some SecSk.
5 Hyperliveness
According to Alpern and Schneider [4], the “good thing” in a liveness property is
 always possible, no matter what has occurred so far, and
 possibly inﬁnite, so it need not be a discrete event.
Forexample, guaranteedserviceGS (2.3)isalivenesspropertyinwhichthegoodthing
is the eventual response to a request. This good thing is always possible, because a state
in which a response is produced can always be appended to any ﬁnite trace containing
a request. And this good thing is not inﬁnite because the response is a discrete event,
but starvation freedom, which stipulates that a system makes progress inﬁnitely often,
is an example of a liveness property with an inﬁnite good thing.
Formally, a good thing is an inﬁnite sufﬁx of a ﬁnite trace.
Liveness property. Trace property L is a liveness property [4] iff
(8t 2 	n : (9t0 2 	inf : t  t0 ^ t0 2 L)):
Deﬁne LP to be the set of all liveness properties. Not surprisingly, LP is a hyperpro-
perty.
Just as with hypersafety, we generalize liveness to hyperliveness by generalizing a
ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces. The deﬁnition of hyperliveness is essentially
the same as the deﬁnition of liveness, except for an additional level of sets.
Liveness hyperproperty. Hyperproperty L is a liveness hyperproperty (is hyper-
liveness) iff
(8T 2 Obs : (9T0 2 Prop : T  T0 ^ T0 2 L)):
Deﬁne LHP to be the set of all liveness hyperproperties.
Mean response time RT (2.7) is not liveness but it is hyperliveness: the good thing
is that the mean response time is low enough. Given any observation T with any mean
response time, it is always possible to extend T, such that the resulting system has
a low enough mean response time, by adding a trace that has many quick responses.
Note that if this policy were approximated by limiting the maximum response time in
each execution, then the resulting hyperproperty would be a lifted safety property.
In deﬁning RT, section 2 used predicate mean() and deﬁned mean(X) = 0 for
inﬁnite X. This deﬁnition caused RT to ignore all systems that process an inﬁnite
14number of requests. A more satisfying way to solve this problem (without deﬁning
mean(X) for inﬁnite X) is to deﬁne a variant of RT as follows:
RT
0 , fT 2 Prop j (8M 2 Obs : M  T









0 requires any ﬁnite preﬁx M of system T to become good (i.e., have a low mean
response time) within a ﬁnite extension N. RT
0 is hyperliveness; the good thing is N
with each of its ﬁnite traces extended to an inﬁnite trace without adding new requests
or responses.
Some additional consequences of the deﬁnition of hyperliveness are:
 The only hyperproperty that is both hypersafety and hyperliveness is true, de-
ﬁned as Prop. The hyperproperty false, deﬁned as f;g, is hypersafety but not
hyperliveness.16
 Liveness properties lift to liveness hyperproperties.
Proposition 2. (8L 2 Prop : L 2 LP () [L] 2 LHP)
 Set LP of all liveness properties is a liveness hyperproperty: every observation
can be extended to any liveness property.
 Similarly, set SP of all safety properties is a liveness hyperproperty: every obser-
vation can be extended to a safety property (whose bad thing is “not beginning
execution with one of the ﬁnite traces in the observation”).
Possibilistic information ﬂow. Some information-ﬂow security policies, such as ob-
servational determinism OD (2.6), restrict nondeterminism of a system from being
publicly observable. However, observable nondeterminism might be useful, for a cou-
ple of reasons. First, systems might exhibit nondeterminism due to scheduling. If
the scheduler cannot be inﬂuenced by secret information (i.e., the scheduler does not
serve as a covert timing channel), then it is reasonable to allow the scheduler to behave
nondeterministically. Second, nondeterminism is a useful modeling abstraction when
dealing with probabilistic systems (which we consider in more detail in section 7.2.4).
When the exact probabilities for a system are unknown, they can be abstracted by non-
determinism. For at least these reasons, there is a history of research on possibilistic
information-ﬂow security policies, beginning with nondeducibility [58] and general-
ized noninterference [39]. Such policies are founded on the intuition that low observers
of a system should gain little from their observations. Typically, these policies require
that every low observation is consistent with some large set of possible high behaviors.
16The false property is the empty set of traces, so it might seem reasonable to deﬁne false as the empty
set of trace sets. But then the lift of the false property would not equal false. Note that false is not satisﬁed
by any system because, by deﬁnition, ; is not a system.
15McLean [41] shows that possibilistic information-ﬂow policies can be expressed as
trace sets that are closed with respect to selective interleaving functions. Such func-
tions, given two executions of a system, specify another trace that must also be an ex-
ecution of the system—as did the deﬁnition of generalized noninterference GNI (2.5).
Mantel [37] generalizes from these functions to closure operators, which extend a set
S of executions to a set S0 such that S  S0. Mantel argues that every possibilistic
information-ﬂow policy can be expressed as a closure operator.
Given a closure operator Cl that expresses a possibilistic information-ﬂow policy,
the hyperproperty PCl induced by Cl is
PCl , fCl(T) j T 2 Propg:
Deﬁne the set PIF of all such hyperproperties to be
S
Cl PCl. It is now easy to see that
these are liveness hyperproperties: any observation T can be extended to its closure.
Theorem 3. PIF  LHP
Possibilistic information-ﬂow policies are therefore never hypersafety.17
Temporal logics. Consider the hyperproperty “For every initial state, there is some
terminating trace, but not all traces must terminate,” denoted as NNT. In branching-
time temporal logic, NNT could be expressed as
 terminates; (5.2)
where terminates is a state predicate and  is the “not never” operator.18 There is
no linear-time temporal predicate that expresses NNT, nor is there a liveness property
equivalent to NNT [33]; an approximation would be a linear-time predicate, or a live-
ness property, that requires every trace to terminate. However, NNT is hyperliveness
because any ﬁnite trace can be extended to a set of executions such that at least one
execution terminates.
This example suggests a relationship between hyperproperties and branching-time
temporal predicates, and between trace properties and linear-time temporal predicates.
We can make this relationship precise by examining the semantics of temporal logic. In
both branching time and linear time, a semantic model contains a set of states and a val-
uation function assigning a Boolean value to each atomic proposition in each state. Ad-
ditionally, a branching-time model requires a current state and a set of traces, whereas
a linear-time model requires a single trace [21]. These requirements differ because a
linear-time predicate is a property of a trace, whereas a branching-time predicate is a
property of a state and all the future traces that could proceed from that state. Thus,
trace properties model linear-time predicates, and hyperproperties model branching-
time predicates for a given state.
Moreover, hyperproperties can express policies that branching-time predicates can-
not. Consider the trace property “Every trace must end with an inﬁnite number of good
17Another way to reach this conclusion is to observe that closure operators need not yield hyperproperties
that are subset closed—yet, by Theorem 1, every safety hyperproperty subset closed.
18Temporal logics CTL [13] would express this formula as E F terminates.
16states,” denoted SAG, where good is a state predicate. In linear-time temporal logic,
SAG could be expressed as
   good; (5.3)
where   is the “sometime” operator and  is the “always” operator. SAG is liveness
and thus hyperliveness, but there is no branching-time predicate that expresses it [33].
6 Topology
Topology enables an elegant characterization of the structure of hyperproperties. We
begin by summarizing the topology of trace properties [57].
Consider an observer of an execution of a system, who is permitted to see each
new state as it is produced by the system; otherwise, the system is a black box to the
observer. The observer attempts to determine whether trace property P holds of the
system. At any point in time, the observer has seen only a ﬁnite preﬁx of the (inﬁnite)
execution. Thus, theobservershoulddeclarethatthesystemsatisﬁesP, afterobserving
ﬁnite trace t, only if all possible extensions of t will also satisfy P. Abramsky names
such properties observable [3].
Like the bad thing for a safety property, a observable property must be detectable
in ﬁnite time; and once detected, hold thereafter. Formally, O is a observable property
iff
(8t 2 	inf : t 2 O =) (9m 2 	n : m  t
^ (8t0 2 	inf : m  t0 =) t0 2 O))):
Deﬁne O to be the set of observable properties. This set satisﬁes two closure condi-
tions. First, if O1;:::;On are observable, then
Tn
i=1 Oi is also observable. Second, if
O is a (potentially inﬁnite) set of observable properties, then
S
O2O O is also observ-
able. Thus O is closed under ﬁnite intersections and inﬁnite unions.
A topology on a set S is a set T  P(S) such that T is closed under ﬁnite inter-
sections and inﬁnite unions. Because O is so closed, it is a topology on 	inf. We name
O the Plotkin topology, because Plotkin proposed its use in characterizing safety and
liveness [4].19
The elements of a topology T are called its open sets. A convenient way to charac-
terize the open sets of a topology is in terms of a base or a subbase. A base of topology
T is a set B  T such that every open set is a (potentially inﬁnite) union of elements
of B. A subbase is a set A  T such that the collection of ﬁnite intersections of A is a
base for T . The set
OB , f"t j t 2 	ng
is a base (and a subbase) of the Plotkin topology, where
"t , ft0 2 	inf j t  t0g
is the completion of a ﬁnite trace t. When t  t0 we say that t0 extends t. The comple-
tion of t is thus the set of all inﬁnite extensions of t.
19Topology O is also the Scott topology on the !-algebraic CPO of traces ordered by  [57].
17Alpern and Schneider [4] noted that, in the Plotkin topology, safety properties cor-
respond to closed sets and liveness properties correspond to dense sets. A closed set
is the complement (with respect to S) of an open set. If a trace t is not a member
of a closed set C, then there is some bad thing (speciﬁcally, the preﬁx m of t in the
deﬁnition of observable as instantiated on open set C, the complement of C) that is
to blame; the existence of such bad things makes C a safety property. Likewise, a set
that is dense intersects every non-empty open set in T . So for any ﬁnite trace t and
dense set D, the intersection of "t (which is open because it is a member of OB) and
D is nonempty. Since any ﬁnite trace can be extended to be in D, we have that D is a
liveness property.
We want to construct a topology on sets of traces that extends this correspondence
to hyperproperties. The most important step is generalizing the notion of ﬁnite observ-
ability from trace properties to hyperproperties. Section 3 already did this in general-
izing a ﬁnite trace to a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces—that is, an observation. The observer,
as before, sees the system produce each new state in the execution. However, the ob-
server may now reset the system at any time, causing it to begin a new execution. At
any ﬁnite point in time, the observer has now collected a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite (thus partial)
executions. An observation is thus an element of Obs, as deﬁned in section 3.
An extension of an observation should allow the observer to perform additional
resets of the system, yielding a larger set of traces. An extension should also allow
each execution to proceed longer, yielding longer traces. So an extension corresponds
to trace set preﬁx  (section 3). The completion of observation M is
"M , fT 2 Prop j M  Tg:
We can now deﬁne our topology on sets of traces in terms of its subbase:
O
SB , f"M j M 2 Obsg:
The base O
B of our topology is then O
SB closed under ﬁnite intersections. The base




Finally, our topology O is O
B closed under inﬁnite unions.
Deﬁne C to be the closed sets in our topology and D to be the dense sets. Just
as safety and liveness correspond to closed and dense sets in the Plotkin topology,
hypersafetyandhyperlivenesscorrespondtoclosedanddensesetsinourgeneralization
of that topology.
Proposition 4. SHP = C
Proposition 5. LHP = D
Our topology O is actually equivalent to well-known topology, as stated by the
following theorem. The Vietoris (or ﬁnite or convex Vietoris) topology is a standard
construction of a topology on sets out of an underlying topology [60, 42]. Our under-
lying topology was on traces, and we constructed a topology on sets of traces. The
18Vietoris construction can be decomposed into the lower Vietoris and upper Vietoris
constructions [56], which also yield topologies. Let VL(T ) denote the lower Vietoris
construction, which given underlying topology T on space X produces the topology
on P(X) induced by subbase VSB
L (T ). That subbase is deﬁned as
VSB
L (T ) , fhOi j O 2 T g;
and hTi is deﬁned20 as
hTi , fU 2 P(X) j U \ T 6= ;g:
Theorem 4. O = VL(O)
Smyth [56] established that the lower Vietoris topology is equivalent to the lower
(or Hoare) powerdomain, which is a construction used to model the semantics of non-
determinism [47]. So our topology embodies the same intuition about observability of
nondeterminism as the lower powerdomain does.
The proof of Theorem 4 yields another topological characterization of safety hy-
perproperties: the set of lifted safety properties, closed under inﬁnite intersections and
ﬁnite unions (denoted as closure operator ClC, because these closure conditions char-
acterize a topology of Closed sets), is the set of safety hyperproperties.
Proposition 6. SHP = ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg)
Deﬁning trace set preﬁx. It is reasonable to ask what alternatives might exist to our
deﬁnition of trace set preﬁx , used above to deﬁne extension. Recall that deﬁnition is
T  T0 , (8t 2 T : (9t0 2 T0 : t  t0)):
For clarity, we use L instead of  to refer to that deﬁnition throughout the rest of this
section (L stands for Lower Vietoris).
Two natural alternatives to L are
T U T0 , (8t0 2 T0 : (9t 2 T : t  t0));
T C T0 , T L T0 ^ T U T0:
(U and C stand for Upper and Convex Vietoris. These preﬁx relations correspond to
the eponymous topologies.) However, both alternatives turn out to be unsuitable for our
purposes, because they do not correspond to our intuition about ﬁnite observability—as
we now explain.
Hyperproperty O is observable iff
(8T 2 Prop : T 2 O =) (9M 2 Obs : M  T
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 2 O))):
20Operators [] (from section 2) and hi bear some similarity to the modal logic operators  (necessity)
and  (possibility): For trace property T, lift [T] denotes the set of all reﬁnements of T—that is, the
hyperproperty in which T is necessary. Similarly, hTi denotes the set of all trace properties that share a
trace with T—that is, the hyperproperty in which T is always possible.
19Consider using U for trace set preﬁx . For a concrete example, suppose that  =
fa;b;cg, O is observable, T 2 O, and M = fa;bg. Any T0 such that MUT0 must
be a member of O. Every trace t0 in T0 must begin with either a or b and cannot
begin with c. In particular, T0 might contain traces beginning only with b, never with
a. Observation M therefore characterizes a system in which a nondeterministic choice
to produce c as the ﬁrst state is not possible. So with U, an observation records
what nondeterminism is denied, and all future extensions of that observation are also
required to deny that nondeterminism.
In contrast, with L (i.e., our topology), an observation records what nondeter-
minism has so far been permitted, and all future extensions of that observation are
required also to permit that nondeterminism. Our intuition is that observers of a black-
box system can observe permitted nondeterminism (by observing states produced by
the system) but not denied nondeterminism. The deﬁnition of U does not correspond
to that intuition, but the deﬁnition of L does. Similarly, using C for trace set preﬁx
leads to observations that record both permitted and denied nondeterminism (because
C is the conjunction of L and U), and therefore C does not correspond to our
intuition, either.
So neither the upper nor the convex Vietoris topologies enjoys open sets that are
the observable hyperproperties; consequently, the equivalence of closed sets and hyper-
safety is lost. Nonetheless, these topologies might be useful for other purposes—for
example, in refusal semantics for CSP [29].
7 Beyond Hypersafety and Hyperliveness
7.1 Intersections
Security policies can exhibit features of both safety and liveness. For example, con-
sider a policy on a medical information system that must maintain the conﬁdential-
ity of patient records and must also eventually notify patients whenever their records
are accessed [6]. If the conﬁdentiality requirement is interpreted as observational de-
terminism OD (2.6), then this system must both prevent bad things (OD, which is
hypersafety) as well as guarantee good things (eventual notiﬁcation, which can be for-
mulated as liveness). As another example, consider an asynchronous proactive secret
sharing system [66] that must maintain and periodically refresh a secret. Each share
refresh must complete during a given time interval with high probability. Maintain-
ing the conﬁdentiality of the secret can be formulated as SecS (4.1), which is hy-
persafety. The eventual refresh of the secret shares can be formulated as liveness:
every execution eventually completes the refresh if enough servers remain uncompro-
mised. And the high probability that the refresh succeeds within a given time interval
is hyperliveness—similar to mean response time RT (2.7). Both of these examples
illustrate hyperproperties that are intersections of (hyper)safety and (hyper)liveness.
In fact, as stated by the following theorem, every hyperproperty is the intersection
of a safety hyperproperty with a liveness hyperproperty. This theorem generalizes the
result of Alpern and Schneider [4] that every trace property is the intersection of a
safety property and a liveness property.
20Theorem 5. (8P 2 HP : (9S 2 SHP;L 2 LHP : P = S \ L))
7.2 System Representations
Recall that hyperproperties are system properties in which system execution is modeled
as trace sets. But some models of system execution are expressed with other mathemat-
ical formalisms. For example, Goguen and Meseguer’s noninterference GMNI (2.4)
assumed that systems are deterministic state machines.
We have not yet classiﬁed GMNI as hypersafety or hyperliveness. Recall that our
formalization of GMNI included the conjunct “T 2 SM”, where hyperproperty SM is
the set of all trace sets that encode deterministic state machines. Therefore GMNI ex-
cludes all trace sets that do not encode a deterministic state machine. It is reasonable to
expect that GMNI is hypersafety; the bad thing is a set ft;t0g of ﬁnite traces where t0
contains no high inputs and contains the same low inputs as t, yet t and t0 have different
low outputs. But GMNI fails to be hypersafety because of a technicality—a system T
might fail to satisfy GMNI only because T is nondeterministic, in which case a deter-
ministic, non-interfering observation of T would be remediable hence GMNI would
not be hypersafety.21 The problem is that the deﬁnition of hypersafety, by quantify-
ing over Prop, assumed that systems are allowed to be nondeterministic. Now that we
are interested in a restricted system representation, we need to restrict the deﬁnition of
hypersafety and quantify over a smaller set of systems. Let Rep be a set of trace sets
denoting a system representation—that is, a subset of Prop containing those trace sets
that represent systems of interest. And let Obs(Rep) denote the subset of Obs contain-
ing observations of Rep, where Obs(Rep) = fM 2 Obs j (9T 2 Rep : M  T)g.
Now we can deﬁne hypersafety and hyperliveness for a given system representation.
Safety hyperproperty for system representation Rep. A hyperproperty S is a
safety hyperproperty for system representation Rep (is hypersafety for Rep) iff
(8T 2 Rep : T = 2 S =) (9M 2 Obs(Rep) : M  T
^ (8T0 2 Rep : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 S))):
Liveness hyperproperty for system representation Rep. Hyperproperty L is a
liveness hyperproperty for system representation Rep (is hyperliveness for Rep) iff
(8T 2 Obs(Rep) : (9T0 2 Rep : T  T0 ^ T0 2 L)):
GMNI indeed is hypersafety for SM, fulﬁlling our expectation.
The results proved in this paper about hypersafety and hyperliveness generalize
naturally to speciﬁc system representations. Informally, the generalizations are as fol-
lows:22
21A similar problem would occur even if we used implication instead of conjunction to formalize the
requirement that systems be deterministic state machines: any observation would be remediated by adding
traces that represent nondeterministic transitions of the state machine.
22We leave generalizing the topological results as future work. However, since the intersection theorem
generalizes, we believe that the topological results also will generalize.
21 If P is safety (liveness) for Rep, then [P] is hypersafety (hyperliveness) for Rep.
(Generalizing Propositions 1 and 2.)
 If P is hypersafety for Rep, then P is subset closed for Rep, but not necessarily
subset closed for Prop. (Generalizing Theorem 1.) Consequently, stepwise re-
ﬁnement does not necessarily work with hyperproperties that are hypersafety for
Rep.
 If P is a possibilistic information-ﬂow policy for Rep, then P is hyperliveness
for Rep. (Generalizing Theorem 3.)
 k-hypersafety for Rep can be reduced to safety for Rep
k. (Generalizing Theo-
rem 2.)
 Every hyperproperty for Rep is the intersection of a safety hyperproperty for Rep
with a liveness hyperproperty for Rep. (Generalizing Theorem 5.)
Appendix C gives formal statements of these results. The proofs of these results are all
straightforward corollaries of the original results, although some proofs require addi-
tional assumptions about Rep.
We now explore system properties in various system representations—relational
systems, labeled transition systems, state machines, and probabilistic systems—by en-
coding each into trace sets, thus into hyperproperties.
7.2.1 Relational Systems
In language-based information-ﬂow security [52], a program P is sometimes modeled
(e.g., with large-step operational semantics) as a relation + such that hP;si + s0 if P
begun in initial state s terminates in ﬁnal state s0. Using this relation, noninterference
can be stated as
s1 =L s2 ^ hP;s1i + s0




where relation =L (c.f. observational determinism OD (2.6)) determines which states
are low-equivalent. This statement of noninterference is termination insensitive be-
cause it allows information to leak through termination channels.
To model a program P as set T of traces, intuitively, imagine that an observer of the
program periodically checks to see in what state the program is. If P begun in initial
state s never terminates, then the observer will see an inﬁnite sequence containing only
s. If P does terminate in ﬁnal state s0, then the observer will see a ﬁnite sequence of s
followed by an inﬁnite sequence of s0. Let T be the set of all such traces. Formally, T
is deﬁned as follows:
T = ft 2 	inf j hP;si + s0 ^ t 2 s+(s0)!g
[ ft 2 	inf j :(9s0 : hP;si + s0) ^ t = s!g:
Let Rel, the set of all relational systems, be the set of all trace sets so constructed for
any P.
22Deﬁne termination-insensitive relational noninterference as a hyperproperty:
TIRNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 Rel
^ (8t1;t2 2 T : t1[0] =L t2[0]
=) diverges(t1) _ diverges(t2)
_ (9s1;s2 2  : terminates(t1;s1)
^ terminates(t2;s2) ^ s1 =L s2))g: (7.1)
Predicate diverges(t) holds whenever t is a trace of a program P such that P does
not terminate when begun in initial state t[0], so t = (t[0])!. Similarly, predicate
terminates(t;s) holds whenever P terminates in ﬁnal state s when begun in initial
state t[0], so t = (t[0])+s!. We assume without loss of generality that ﬁnal states are
distinguishable from initial states (e.g., by having a special ﬂag set), so that diverges
and terminates can distinguish between nontermination and termination in a ﬁnal state
that otherwise is identical to an initial state. TIRNI is hypersafety for Rel; the bad
thing is a pair of traces that begin in low-equivalent initial states but terminate in ﬁnal
states that are not low-equivalent.
Termination sensitive noninterference is the same as termination insensitive, except
that it forbids one trace to diverge and the other to terminate. So deﬁne termination-
sensitive relational noninterference as follows:
TSRNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 Rel
^ (8t1;t2 2 T : t1[0] =L t2[0]
=) (diverges(t1) ^ diverges(t2))
_ (9s1;s2 2  : terminates(t1;s1)
^ terminates(t2;s2) ^ s1 =L s2))g: (7.2)
Note that the only change is that a disjunction became a conjunction. TSRNI is not
hypersafety for Rel: A system containing a pair ft;t0g of traces, where t diverges and
t0 does not, yet where t and t0 contain low-equivalent initial states, does not satisfy
TSRNI. But any ﬁnite preﬁx of this pair could be remediated by causing the preﬁx of
t to terminate in the same ﬁnal state as t0. Likewise, TSRNI is not hyperliveness for
Rel:23 Consider a ﬁnite observation containing a pair of terminating traces that have
low-equivalent initial states but not low-equivalent ﬁnal states. This observation cannot
be extended to be in TSRNI.
7.2.2 Labeled Transition Systems
Deﬁnitions of noninterference are sometimes based on bisimulation, which is a relation
that speciﬁes whether two systems are equivalent to an observer. Bisimulations are
23Terauchi and Aiken [59] characterized termination-sensitive noninterference as “2-liveness,” where they
deﬁned “2-liveness” as a “property which may observe up to two possibly inﬁnite traces to refute the prop-
erty.” Although they are correct that TSRNI could be refuted by observing two inﬁnite traces, refutation is
really about safety, not liveness—there is no good thing for TSRNI, but there is an inﬁnitely-observable bad
thing. So “2-inﬁnite-safety” would be a better term than “2-liveness.”
23often expressed over labeled transition systems, which are triples (S;L;!) where S
is a set of LTS-states,24 L is a set of labels, and ! is a relation on S  L  S [44].
Elements of relation ! are usually notated s1
` ! s2 and are interpreted to mean that
the system has a transition labeled ` from LTS-state s1 to LTS-state s2.
A labeled transition system (S;L;!) can be encoded as a set of traces. Deﬁne the
state space  for the traces to be S  L.25 Given state s 2 , let st(s) denote the
LTS-state from s, and let lab(s) denote the label from s. Deﬁne traces(S;L;!) to be
ft j (8i 2 N : st(t[i])
lab(t[i])
! st(t[i + 1]))g:26
Let LTS be the set of all trace sets so constructed for any LTS.
We now demonstrate how to use this encoding by formalizing Focardi and Gorri-
eri’s [22] deﬁnition of bisimulation nondeducibility on compositions (BNDC), which
is a noninterference policy for nondeterministic LTSs. The intuition behind this pol-
icy is that a system should appear the same to a low observer no matter with what
other system it is composed (i.e., run in parallel). Assume that set L of labels can
be partitioned into three sets of actions (i.e., events): a set of low security actions,
a set H of high security actions, and fg, where  is an unobservable internal ac-
tion. An LTS E = (S;L;!) satisﬁes BNDC, denoted BNDC(E), iff for all LTSs
F = (S;H [ fg;!F) that take only high and internal actions,
E=H  (EjF) n H;
with notations =, j, n, and  informally deﬁned as follows:27
 Hiding operator E=H relabels all actions from H that occur during execution of
E as , thus making them unobservable. System E=H thus represents the view
of system E by a low observer, since all the high actions are hidden.
 Parallel composition operator EjF denotes the interleaving of systems E and F.
The systems can synchronize on actions, causing the composed system to emit
internal action .
 Restriction operator E n H prohibits the occurrence of any actions from H dur-
ing execution of E, meaning that no transition with a label from H is allowed.
System (EjF)nH thus represents a low observer’s view of E when all the high
actions that E takes are synchronized with F.
 Weak bisimulation relation E  F intuitively means that E and F can simu-
late each other: if E can take a transition with label `, then there must exist a
transition of F that is also labeled `, and after taking those transitions E and F
24We use the term LTS-state to distinguish these from the states deﬁned in section 2.
25This construction would not work with an impoverished notion of state, as observed by Focardi and
Gorrieri [22] for states that are elements only of L.
26We could replace lab(t[i]) with lab(t[i + 1]) in this deﬁnition; the choice of where to store the label is
arbitrary.
27The formal deﬁnitions (over LTSs) are standard and given by Focardi and Gorrieri [22]. It is straightfor-
ward to deﬁne them directly over trace sets.
24must remain bisimilar. F is allowed to take any number of internal transitions
(labeled ) before or after the `-labeled transition. Further, the relation must be
symmetric, such that if E  F then F  E.
Thus, if E=H  (EjF) n H, then a low observer’s view of E does not change when
E is composed with any high security system F. The hyperproperty corresponding to
Focardi and Gorrieri’s BNDC is
BNDC , fT 2 Prop j T 2 LTS
^ (9E 2 LTS : T = traces(E)
^ BNDC(E))g: (7.3)
BNDC is hyperliveness for LTS because of the existential in deﬁnition of : any
observation can be remedied by adding additional transitions. This remediation corre-
sponds to a closure operator because it only adds traces, thus BNDC is a possibilistic-
information ﬂow policy.
Appendix B presents another bisimulation-based noninterference policy as a hyper-
property.
7.2.3 State Machines
Goguen and Meseguer [23] deﬁne a state machine as a tuple (S;C;O;out;do;s0),
where S is a set of machine states, C is a set of commands, O is a set of outputs, out
is a function from S to O yielding what output the user of the machine observes when
the machine is in a given state, do is a function from S  C to S describing how the
machine transitions between states as a function of commands, and s0 is the initial state
of the machine.28 Such state machines are deterministic because do is a function rather
than a relation.
A state machine M = (S;C;O;out;do;s0) can be encoded as a set of traces. The
construction proceeds in two steps. First, M is encoded as a labeled transition system
(c.f. section 7.2.2) by treating the machine commands and outputs as labels: Let the
set ^ S of LTS-states be set S of machine states. Let the set ^ L of labels be product set
C  O of commands and outputs. Let the transition relation ! include (s;(c;o);s0)
whenever do(s;c) = s0 and out(s0) = o. We now have a labeled transition system
L = (^ S; ^ L;!). Second, the traces of M are the traces of L that start with s0: let
traces(M) be traces(^ S;L;!) \ ft 2 	inf j t[0] = s0g.
The set SM of all state machines is a hyperproperty:
SM , fT 2 Prop j (9M : T = traces(M))g: (7.4)
As noted at the beginning of this section, GMNI is hypersafety for SM.
28Our deﬁnition of state machines simpliﬁes Goguen and Meseguer’s by omitting user clearances, though
the clearances still appear in the deﬁnition of GMNI.
257.2.4 Probabilistic Systems
A probabilistic system is equipped with a function p such that the system transitions
from a state s to state s0 with probability p(s;s0).29 This probability is Markovian
because it does not depend upon past or future states in an execution; nonetheless,
dependenceuponthepastorfuturecanbemodeledbyallowingstatestocontainhistory
orprophecyvariables[1]. Functionpcanitselfevenbe encodedintothestateinvarious
ways. For example, state s could record p(s;s0) for all states s0. Or in a trace t, state t[i]
could record p(t[i];t[i+1]). This latter encoding is an instantiation of the construction
in section 7.2.2 for encoding labeled transition systems as sets of traces; here, the labels
are probabilities. Either way, probabilistic systems can be modeled as sets of traces.
Deﬁne PR to be the set of all trace sets that encode probabilistic systems—that is, trace
set T is in PR if T encodes a valid probability function p(;).
To obtain a probability measure on sets of traces, let Prs;S(T) denote the probabil-
ity with which set T of ﬁnite traces is produced by probabilistic system S beginning
in initial state s.30 O’Neill et al. [46] show how to construct this probability measure
from p. We now demonstrate how the measure can be used in the deﬁnitions of hyper-
properties.
Probabilistic noninterference. In information-ﬂow security, the original motivation
for adding probability to system models was to address covert channels and to estab-
lish connections between information theory and information ﬂow [43, 24, 25]. Proba-
bilistic noninterference [25] emerged from this line of research. Intuitively, this policy
requires that the probability of every low trace be the same for every low-equivalent
initial state. To formulate probabilistic noninterference as a hyperproperty, we need
some notation. Let the low equivalence class of a ﬁnite trace t be denoted [t]L, where
[t]L , ft0 2 	n j evL(t) = evL(t0)g:
The probability that system S, starting in state s, produces a trace that is low-equivalent
to t is therefore Prs;S([t]L). Let the set of initial states of trace property T be denoted
Init(T), where
Init(T) , fs j fsg  Tg:
Probabilistic noninterference can now be expressed as follows:
PNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 PR
^ (8s1;s2 2 Init(T) : evL(s1) = evL(s2)
=) (8t 2 	n : Prs1;T([t]L) = Prs2;T([t]L)))g: (7.5)
PNI is not hyperliveness for PR, because a system that deterministically produces
two non-low-equivalent traces from two initial low-equivalent states cannot be ex-
tended to satisfy PNI. Whether PNI is hypersafety for PR depends on whether state
29To be a valid probability, p(s;s0) must be in the real interval [0,1] for all s and s0; and for all s, P
s0 p(s;s0) must equal 1.
30The initial state can be eliminated if we also assume a prior probability on initial states [26, x6.5]. The
requirement that the traces in T be ﬁnite is, however, essential to ensure that Prs;S(T) is a valid probability
measure.
26space  is ﬁnite. To see why, consider a system T such that T = 2 PNI and T 2 PR.
We can attempt to construct a bad thing M for T as follows. Since T = 2 PNI, there
exists a trace tL of low events that is produced by initial states s1 and s2 with differing
probabilities. Let M be the preﬁx of T that completely determines the probability of
tL for those initial states:
M = ft 2 	n j t[0] 2 fs1;s2g ^ t  T ^ evL(t) = tLg
Recall that bad things must be ﬁnitely observable and irremediable. M is irremediable
because no extension of it can change the probability of tL for initial states s1 and s2.
But is M ﬁnitely observable—that is, is M 2 Obs? Recall that an element of Obs must
be a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces. Each trace in M is ﬁnite, but M might not be a ﬁnite set:
 If state space  is countably inﬁnite,31 then there could be inﬁnitely many states
to which s1 (and s2) transition. Hence there could need to be inﬁnitely many
traces in M to completely determine the probability of tL, so M could not be
in Obs. Moreover, any ﬁnite subset N of M necessarily omits some states from
. So it might be possible to extend N to a system T0 that satisﬁes PNI by
adding traces that use those omitted states to make the probability of tL equal
for the initial states. Thus T would have no bad thing, and PNI would not be
hypersafety for PR.
 If  is ﬁnite, then only ﬁnitely many ﬁnite traces are low-equivalent to tL. Thus
M is ﬁnite, and no extension of T0 of M can change the probability of tL. So T0
cannot be in PNI. Therefore PNI is hypersafety for PR.
Gray’s deﬁnition of probabilistic noninterference [25] is hypersafety for PR, because
Gray required the state (and input and output) space to be ﬁnite. But the deﬁnition
of O’Neill et al. [46] is neither hypersafety nor hyperliveness, because it allowed a
countably inﬁnite state space.
Secure encryption. A private-key encryption scheme is a tuple (M, K, C, Gen, Enc,
Dec), where M is the message space, K is the key space, and C is the ciphertext space
such that the following hold.
 Gen is the key-generation algorithm, a randomized algorithm that produces a
key k 2 K. We write k   Gen to denote the sampling of k from the probability
distribution induced by Gen.
 Enc is the encryption algorithm, an algorithm (either randomized or determinis-
tic) that accepts a key k 2 K, a plaintext message m 2 M, and yields a cipher-
text c 2 C that is the encryption of m using k. We denote this as c = Enc(m;k).
 Dec is the decryption algorithm, a deterministic algorithm that accepts a key
k 2 K, a ciphertext c 2 C, and yields a plaintext m that is the decryption of c
using k. We denote this as m = Dec(c;k).
31State space  cannot be uncountably inﬁnite without generalizing probability function p(;) to a prob-
ability measure.
27 Decryption is the inverse of encryption. Formally, for all m 2 M and k 2 K,
Pr(Dec(Enc(m;k);k) = m) = 1:
A private-key encryption scheme satisﬁes perfect indistinguishability [31] if the prob-
ability distribution on ciphertexts is the same for all plaintexts. Formally, for all m1,
m2, and c,
Pr(k   Gen : Enc(m1;k) = c) = Pr(k   Gen : Enc(m2;k) = c):
Perfect indistinguishability can be formulated as a hyperproperty on probabilistic
systems. To encode encryption scheme (M, K, C, Gen, Enc, Dec) as a probabilistic
system, let the set of states of the system be
M [ K [ C [ fGeng
[ fEnc(m;k) j k 2 K;m 2 Mg [ fDec(c;k) j k 2 K;c 2 Cg:
Let probability function p(;) be deﬁned such that
 p(Gen;k) = Pr(k = Gen),
 p(Enc(m;k);c) = Pr(c = Enc(m;k)), and
 p(Dec(c;k);m) = 1 iff Dec(c;k) = m.
Let the system so constructed from (M, K, C, Gen, Enc, Dec) be denoted
encSys(M;K;C;Gen;Enc;Dec);
and let the set of all such systems be ES. The following hyperproperty expresses
perfect indistinguishability:
PI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 ES
^ (9M;K;C;Gen;Enc;Dec :
T = encSys(M;K;C;Gen;Enc;Dec)
^ (8m1;m2 2 M;c 2 C :
Pr(Enc(m1) = c)
= Pr(Enc(m2) = c)))g; (7.6)




PI is hypersafety for ES because any encryption scheme that is not in PI has a
ciphertext c and two messages m1, m2 such that the probability that m1 encrypts to c
is not equal to the probability that m2 encrypts to c. Trace set fEnc(m;k);c j k 2
K;m 2 fm1;m2gg thus is irremediable, and it is ﬁnite assuming that key space K is
ﬁnite. So the trace set is a bad thing. But PI is not subset closed for Prop, thus stepwise
reﬁnement is not applicable with PI.
Other deﬁnitions of secure encryption, such as computational indistinguishability

























Figure 1: Classiﬁcation of security policies
Quantifying information ﬂow. Probability can also be used to reason about the
amount of information that a system can leak. For example, channel capacity is the
maximum rate at which information can be reliably sent over a channel [54]; Gray [25]
formulates as a channel the leakage of secret information from a system, and he quan-
tiﬁes the capacity of that channel. The hyperproperty “The channel capacity is k bits”
(denoted CCk) can be shown to be hyperliveness for PR, since no matter what the rate
is for some ﬁnite preﬁx of the system, the rate can changed to any arbitrary amount by
an appropriate extension that conveys more or less information.
To measure quantity of leakage from repeated experiments in probabilistic pro-
grams, Clarkson et al. [14] use a probabilistic denotational semantics. This semantics
can be used to deﬁne a system, and the traces of the system represent repeated execu-
tions of the program. The hyperproperty “The quantity of leakage over every series of
experiments on program S is less than k bits” (denoted QLk) then can be shown to be
hypersafety for a variant of PR. For details, see Appendix B.
8 Concluding Remarks
Many security policies have been classiﬁed as hyperproperties in this paper. Figure 1
summarizes this classiﬁcation.
Although this paper formulates security policies with hyperproperties, security
policies historically have been formulated in terms of conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
availability requirements [30, 16, 17]. The relation between these two formulations is
an open question, but we can offer some observations:
29 Information-ﬂow conﬁdentiality is not a trace property, but it is a hyperproperty,
anditcanbehypersafety(e.g., observationaldeterminism)orhyperliveness(e.g.,
generalized noninterference).
 Integrity, which we have not discussed in this paper, includes examples from
safety, hypersafety, and hyperliveness.
 Availabilityissometimeshypersafety(maximumresponsetimeinanyexecution,
which is also safety) and sometimes hyperliveness (mean response time over all
executions).
The classiﬁcation of security requirements as conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability
therefore would seem to be orthogonal to hypersafety and hyperliveness. Hypersafety
and hyperliveness have the advantages of being formalized and providing an orthogo-
nal basis for constructing security policies. In contrast, there is no formalization that
simultaneously characterizes conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability,32 nor are conﬁ-
dentiality, integrity, and availability orthogonal.33
Finally, no relatively complete veriﬁcation methodology exists for conﬁdentiality,
integrity, or availability. But there is such a methodology for trace properties: given
a trace property P, construct a safety property S and a liveness property L such that
P = S\L, then use invariance arguments to verify S and well-foundedness arguments
to verify L [4, 5]. And we have now taken steps toward generalizing this methodol-
ogy to apply to hyperproperties. Theorem 5 shows that every hyperproperty P can be
expressed as the intersection of a safety hyperproperty S and a liveness hyperproperty
L, and the proof of Theorem 5 shows that S and L can be constructed from P. If S is
a k-safety hyperproperty, then by Theorem 2, it can be veriﬁed using reasoning about
safety. It remains an open question whether general methods exist that are relatively
complete for veriﬁcation of safety hyperproperties that are not k-safety, or for live-
ness hyperproperties.34 Such methods would complete the veriﬁcation methodology
for hyperproperties. Then, security might take its place as “just another” functional
requirement to be veriﬁed.
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35A Summary of Notation
Bold face denotes “hyper” and sans serif denotes sets of (trace or hyper-) properties.
Predicates and functions always begin with lower case, whereas (trace or hyper-) prop-
erties always begin with upper case.
 set of all states
	n set of all ﬁnite traces
	inf set of all inﬁnite traces




Prop set of all trace properties
P powerset operator
j= trace property (and hyperproperty) satisfaction
NRW trace property “no read then write”
AC trace property “access control”
GS trace property “guaranteed service”
HP set of all hyperproperties
[P] lift of trace property P to equivalent hyperproperty
GMNI hyperproperty “Goguen and Meseguer’s noninterference”
GNI hyperproperty “generalized noninterference”
OD hyperproperty “observational determinism”
=L low-indistinguishability relation on states
L low-indistinguishability relation on traces
RT hyperproperty “mean response time”
SSC set of all subset-closed hyperproperties
SP set of all safety properties
 trace (or trace set) preﬁx
Obs set of all observations
SHP set of all safety hyperproperties
KSHP(k) set of all k-safety hyperproperties
Sk k-fold parallel self-composition
Sys set of all systems
SecS hyperproperty “secret sharing”
LP set of all liveness properties
LHP set of all liveness hyperproperties
RT
0 hyperproperty “mean response time, alternate formulation”
true hyperproperty that holds of all systems
false hyperproperty that holds of no systems
Cl closure operator
PIF set of all possibilistic information-ﬂow hyperproperties
NNT hyperproperty “not never terminates”
SAG trace property “sometime always good”
O open sets of Plotkin topology
36" completion of trace or observation
O open sets of our topology
C closed sets of our topology
D dense sets of our topology
VL lower Vietoris construction
ClC closure under inﬁnite intersection and ﬁnite union
Rep system representation
Obs(Rep) observations of a system representation
Rel system representation “relational systems”
TIRNI hyperproperty “termination-insensitive noninterference”
TSRNI hyperproperty “termination-sensitive noninterference”
LTS system representation “labeled transition systems”
BNDC hyperproperty “bisimulation nondeducibility on compositions”
SM system representation “deterministic state machines”
PR system representation “probabilistic systems”
Prs;S(T) probability that set T of ﬁnite traces is produced by probabilistic sys-
tem S beginning in initial state s
PNI hyperproperty “probabilistic noninterference”
ES system representation “encryption schemes”
PI hyperproperty “perfect indistinguishability”
CCk hyperproperty “channel capacity”
QLk hyperproperty “quantitative leakage”
BCNI hyperproperty “Boudol and Castellani’s noninterference”
37B Longer Examples of Hyperproperties
B.1 Boudol and Castellani’s Noninterference
Boudol and Castellani’s [11] deﬁne a bisimulation-based noninterference policy for
concurrent programs. To model this policy as a hyperproperty, we ﬁrst formalize their
model of program execution. They model execution as a binary relation ! on pro-
gram terms and memories; a program term P and a memory  step to a new program
term P0 and memory 0. Deﬁne the set P of states for program P to be the set of
pairs of a program term and a memory, prog(s) to be the program term in state s, and
mem(s) to be the memory in state s. Deﬁne traces(P) to be the set of all traces t
such that prog(t[0]) is P, and for all i, t[i] ! t[i + 1]. This construction encodes P
as a set of traces and is an instance of our general construction for encoding LTSs (c.f.
section 7.2.2); here there are only LTS-states and no labels.
Second, we formalize Boudol and Castellani’s security policy. Let =L be an equiv-
alence relation on memories such that 1 =L 2 means 1 and 2 are indistinguishable
to a low observer. State s can step to state s0 in program P, denoted stepsP(s;s0), if
(9t 2 	inf;i 2 N : t 2 traces(P) ^ t[i] = s ^ t[i + 1] = s0):
Deﬁne P
L (read “bisimilar”) to be a binary relation on P such that if s1 is bisimilar
to s2, then s1 and s2 must have indistinguishable memories to a low observer; further,
if s1 can step to state s0
1, then either s0




2 are bisimilar. Formally, P
L is the largest symmetric binary relation on P such
that
s1 P
L s2 =) mem(s1) =L mem(s2)
^ (9s0













L formalizes Deﬁnition 3.5 (( ;L)-Bisimulation) from [11].
Boudol and Castellani deﬁne program P to be secure, which we denote BCNI(P),
iff P is bisimilar to itself in all initially low-equivalent memories:
BCNI(P) , (81;2 : 1 =L 2 =) (P;1) P
L (P;2)):
BCNI(P) formalizes Deﬁnition 3.8 (Secure Programs) from [11]. The hyperproperty
containing all secure programs according to Boudol and Castellani’s deﬁnition is
BCNI , fT 2 Prop j T 2 LTS =) (9P : T = traces(P) ^ BCNI(P))g:
BCNI is hyperliveness because of the existential quantiﬁer on s0
2 in the deﬁni-
tion of P
L: any observation that contains traces leading to non-bisimilar states can
be remedied by adding additional traces leading to bisimilar states. This remedia-
tion corresponds to a closure operator because it only adds traces, thus BCNI is a
possibilistic-information ﬂow policy.
38B.2 Quantitative Information Flow
We summarize the model of Clarkson et al. [14]. A state has an immutable high com-
ponent and a mutable low component. A repeated experiment on probabilistic program
S is a ﬁnite sequence of executions of S. Each individual execution is an experiment.
An execution is represented by two states: an initial state, in which inputs are provided
to the program, and a ﬁnal state, in which outputs are given by the program (c.f. rela-
tional systems in section 7.2.1). All initial states (across all executions) in a repeated
experiment must have the same high component but may have different low compo-
nents. The probabilistic behavior of S is modeled by a semantics JSK that maps inputs
states to output distributions, where (JSKs)(s0) is the probability that S begun in state
s terminates in state s0. An attacker begins an experiment with a prebelief about the
high component of the initial state. After observing the output of the execution, the
attacker updates his prebelief to produce a postbelief about the high component of the
initial state.
We here use traces and events to represent repeated experiments, where each state
in a trace produces an event.35 The events alternate between input and output, and the
ﬁrst event in a trace must be an input. Each output must have the correct probability of
occurring according to JSK and the most recent input. Each low input component may
vary, but the high component must be the same in each input. Let Syst(S) denote the
system of such traces resulting from program S:
Syst(S) , ft 2 	n j (8i : 0  2i + 1  jtj
=) evHin(t[2i]) = evHin(t[0])
^ p(t[2i];t[2i + 1]) = (JSKt[2i])(t[2i + 1]))g;
where jtj denotes the length of ﬁnite trace t, and p(;) is the probability function used
in section 7.2.4. From Syst(S) we can construct probability measure Prs;Syst(S), also
used in section 7.2.4.36 The set of program states must be ﬁnite for the probability
measure to be well-deﬁned.
Each pair of states t[i] and t[i + 1] (for even i) in repeated experiment t yields
an experiment. An experiment is described formally by a prebelief, a high input, a
low input, a low output, and a postbelief. As part of determining the postbelief for an
experiment, the attacker’s prediction A of the low output is calculated from prebelief
bH and low input l:
A(bH;l) , s:bH(evHin(s))  Prr;Syst(S)(feg);
where e is the trace rs, and r is the state that has evHin(s) as its high component and
l as its low component. Denote the ith experiment in trace t, with initial prebelief bH,
35Although observations in which each ﬁnite trace contains two states (initial and ﬁnal) might seem to be
suitable for representing repeated experiments, observations fail to represent the order in which inputs are
provided (in initial states) across the sequence of executions in the repeated experiment. But a single trace
with many states does capture this order.
36Note that p(s;s0) is deﬁned only at every other state in each trace of Syst(S), so to construct the
measure we treat each pair of states in the trace a single state.
39as E(t;i;bH). We deﬁne E(t;i;bH) using OCaml-style record syntax:
E(t;i;bH) , f preBelief = if i > 0 then E(t;i   1):postBelief else bH;
highIn = evHin(t[2i]);
lowIn = evL(t[2i]);
lowOut = evL(t[2i + 1]);
postBelief = (A(bH;l)jlowOut)H g;
where j is the distribution conditioning operator, and  is the distribution projection
operator, from [14].
The quantity of ﬂow in experiment E(t;i;bH), denoted Q(E(t;i;bH)), is deﬁned
in [14, x4]; we do not repeat the formalization here. The quantity of ﬂow over repeated






Hyperproperty QLk is the set of all systems that exhibit at most k bits of ﬂow over any
experiment:
QLk , fT 2 Prop j (9S : T = Syst(S) =) (8t 2 T;bH : Q(bH;t)  k))g:
40C System Representation Results
The results that appear before section 7.2 implicitly assumed that the system represen-
tation was Prop. Section 7.2 generalizes those results to an arbitrary representation
Rep, where Rep is a set of trace sets. We now give the formal statements of those
generalized results.
Let Tr(Rep) denote the set of all traces that are contained in any system in Rep—
that is, Tr(Rep) =
S
T2Rep T. Let Obs(Tr(Rep)) denote the set of all ﬁnite traces that
are preﬁxes of some trace in Tr(Rep)—that is, Obs(Tr(Rep)) = ft 2 	n j (9t0 2
Tr(Rep) : t  t0)g. Let the lift [P]Rep of property P in Rep be P(P) \ Rep.
To generalize safety and liveness to system representations, it sufﬁces to replace
	inf with Tr(Rep), and 	n with Obs(Tr(Rep)). A trace property S is a safety prop-
erty for system representation Rep iff
(8t 2 Tr(Rep) : t = 2 S =) (9m 2 Obs(Tr(Rep)) : m  t ^
(8t0 2 Tr(Rep) : m  t0 =) t0 = 2 S))):
A trace property L is a liveness property for system representation Rep iff
(8t 2 Obs(Tr(Rep)) : (9t0 2 Tr(Rep) : t  t0 ^ t0 2 L)):
Let SP(Rep) be the set of all safety properties for Rep, and let LP(Rep) be the set
of all liveness properties for Rep. Likewise, let SHP(Rep) be the set of all safety
hyperproperties for Rep, and let LHP(Rep) be the set of all liveness hyperproperties
for Rep.
The following results are simple corollaries of the original results, although in some
cases additional assumptions are needed about Rep.
Generalization of Proposition 1. If (8t 2 Tr(Rep) : ftg 2 Rep), then
(8S 2 P(Rep) : S 2 SP(Rep) () [S]Rep 2 SHP(Rep)):
The forward direction of this generalization always holds, but the backward direction
(S 2 SP(Rep) (= [S]Rep 2 SHP(Rep)) might not hold if Rep does not allow individ-
ual traces from Tr(Rep) to be representations, because then the bad thing for a safety
hyperproperty could never be an individual trace, hence the safety hyperproperty could
not be the lift of a safety property. So the backward direction requires the additional
assumption that any individual trace in Tr(Rep) is itself a system representation in
Rep—that is, (8t 2 Tr(Rep) : ftg 2 Rep). Note that Prop satisﬁes this assumption.
Generalization of Proposition 2. If (8T  Tr(Rep) : T 2 Rep), then
(8L 2 P(Rep) : L 2 LP(Rep) () [L]Rep 2 LHP(Rep)):
The backward direction of this generalization always holds, but the forward direction
(L 2 LP(Rep) =) [L]Rep 2 LHP(Rep)) might not hold if Rep does not allow arbi-
trary unions of individual traces from Tr(Rep) to be representations, because then the
41individual good things for a liveness property, when unioned, would not necessarily be
good for the lift of that liveness property. So the forward direction requires the addi-
tional assumption that arbitrary unions of individual traces in Tr(Rep) are themselves
system representations in Rep—that is, (8T  Tr(Rep) : T 2 Rep). Note that Prop
satisﬁes this assumption.
Generalization of Theorem 1. If (9L 2 LP(Rep) : L 6= Tr(Rep)), then
SHP(Rep)  SSC(Rep):
SSC(Rep) is the set of all hyperproperties for Rep that are subset closed on Rep:
P 2 SSC(Rep) () (8T 2 P : (8T0 2 Rep : T0  T =) T0 2 P)):
The strictness of the subset in the theorem generalization requires the additional as-
sumption that there exist subset-closed hyperproperties that are not safety. It sufﬁces
to instead assume that hyperliveness is not trivial for Rep—that is, (9L 2 LP(Rep) :
L 6= Tr(Rep)). Note that Prop satisﬁes both assumptions.
Generalization of Theorem 2.
(8S 2 Rep;K 2 KSHP(k)(Rep) : (9K 2 SP(Rep) : S j= K () Sk j= K))
KSHP(k)(Rep) is the subset of SHP(Rep) where the size of bad thing M is bounded
by k.
Generalization of Theorem 3. If there exists some liveness hyperproperty for Rep
that is not a possibilistic information-ﬂow policy for Rep, then
PIF(Rep)  LHP(Rep):
PIF(Rep) is the set of all possibilistic information-ﬂow policies expressed by closure
operators Cl of type Rep ! Rep. The strictness of the subset requires the additional
assumption about the existence of a liveness hyperproperty for Rep that is not a possi-
bilistic information-ﬂow policy for Rep. Note that Prop satisﬁes this assumption.
Generalization of Theorem 5.
(8P 2 P(Rep) : (9S 2 SHP(Rep);L 2 LHP(Rep) : P = S \ L))
The proof of this generalization requires the following generalized deﬁnition:
Safe(P) , fT 2 Rep j (8M 2 Obs(Rep) : M  T
=) (9T0 2 Rep : M  T0 ^ T0 2 P))g:
Also, in the deﬁnition of Live(P), operator H must now denote the complement of
hyperproperty H with respect to Rep.
42D Proofs
Bueno and Clarkson [12] have formally veriﬁed Propositions 1 and 2, Theorems 2, 3,
and 5, and an analogue of Theorem 1 using the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [45]. We
believe that the remaining proofs could also be formally veriﬁed.
Proposition 1. (8S 2 Prop : S 2 SP () [S] 2 SHP)
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Let S be an arbitrary safety property. We want to show that [S] is a safety
hyperproperty—that is, any trace property T not in [S] contains some bad thing.
First, we ﬁnd a bad thing M for T. By the deﬁnition of lifting, [S] = P(S) =
fP 2 Prop j P  Sg. Since T is not in this set, T 6 S. So some trace t is in
T but not in S. By the deﬁnition of safety, if t = 2 S, there is some ﬁnite trace m
that is a bad thing for S. So no extension of m is in S. Deﬁne M to be fmg.
Second, we show that M is irremediable. Note that M  T because m  t and
t 2 T. Let T0 be an arbitrary trace property that extends M—that is, M  T0.
By the deﬁnition of , there exists a t0 2 T0 such that m  t0. We established
above that no extension of m is in S, so t0 = 2 S. But, again by the deﬁnition of
lifting, T0 = 2 [S], since T0 contains a trace not in S.
Thus, by deﬁnition, [S] is hypersafety.
(() Let S be an arbitrary trace property such that [S] is hypersafety. We want to
show that S is safety. Our strategy is as above—we ﬁnd a bad thing and then
show that it is irremediable.
Consider any t such that t = 2 S. By the deﬁnition of lifting, we have that ftg = 2
[S]. By the deﬁnition of hypersafety applied to [S], there exists an M  ftg
such that for all T0  M, we have T0 = 2 [S].
We claim that M must be non-empty. To show this, suppose for sake of con-
tradiction that M is empty. Then M is a preﬁx of every trace property T0, so
no T0 can be a member of S, which implies that [S] itself must be empty. But
[S] = P(S), so [S] must at least contain S as a member. This is a contradiction,
thus M is non-empty and contains at least one trace.
All traces in M must be preﬁxes of t, by the deﬁnition of . Choose the longest
such preﬁx in M and denote it as m. This m serves as a bad thing for t, as we
show next.
Let t0 be arbitrary such that m  t0, and let T0 = ft0g. By the transitivity of
, we have M  T0, so T0 = 2 [S] by the above application of the deﬁnition of
hypersafety. But this implies that t0 = 2 S, by the deﬁnition of lifting.
We have shown that, for any t = 2 S, there exists an m  t, such that for any
t0  m, we have t0 = 2 S. Therefore, S is safety, by deﬁnition.
43Theorem 1. SHP  SSC
Proof. Assume that S is hypersafety. For sake of contradiction, also assume that S is
not subset closed. This latter assumption implies that there exist two trace properties
T and T0 such that T 2 S, and T0 = 2 S, yet T0  T. By the deﬁnition of hypersafety,
since T0 = 2 S, there exists an observation M that is a bad thing for T0—that is, M  T0
and for all T00 such that M  T00, it holds that T00 = 2 S. Consider this M. By the
deﬁnition of , since T0  T and M  T0, we have M  T. Then T is an instance
of T00 above, which means T = 2 S. But this contradicts T 2 S. Therefore, S must be
subset closed.
To see that the subset relation is strict, deﬁne the trace property true as 	inf.
Consider any liveness property L other than true—for example, guaranteed service
GS (2.3). When lifted to hyperproperty [L], the result is subset closed by deﬁnition
of []. By Proposition 2 below (whose proof does not depend on this theorem), [L]
is hyperliveness. Since L is not true, we have that [L] is not true, which is the only
hyperproperty that is both hypersafety and hyperliveness. So [L] cannot be hypersafety.
Thus [L] is a hyperproperty that is not hypersafety but is subset closed.
Theorem 2. (8S 2 Sys;K 2 KSHP(k) : (9K 2 SP : S j= K () Sk j= K))
Proof. Let K be an arbitrary k-safety hyperproperty of system S. Our strategy is to
construct a safety property K that holds of system Sk exactly when K holds of S.
Since K is k-safety, every trace property not contained in it has some bad thing of
size at most k—that is, for all T = 2 K, there exists an observation M where jMj  k
and M  T, such that for all T0 where M  T0, it holds that T0 = 2 K. Construct the
set M of all such bad things:
M , fM 2 Obs j jMj  k ^ (9T 2 Prop : T = 2 K ^ M  T)
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 K)g:
Next we deﬁne some notation to encode a set of traces as a single trace. Consider
a trace property T such that jTj  k. Construct a ﬁnite list of traces t1;t2;:::;tk such
that ti 2 T for all i. Further, we require that no ti is equal to any tl, for any i and l,
unless jTj < k. We construct a trace t such that t[j] is the tuple (t1[j];t2[j];:::;tk[j]);
note that t is a trace over state space k. Let trace t so constructed from T be denoted
zipk(T), and let the inverse of this construction be denoted unzipk(t); note that zipk()
and unzipk() are partial functions. We can also apply this notation to observations,
which are ﬁnite sets of ﬁnite traces.37
Now we can construct safety property K. Let K be the set of traces over k such
that no trace in K encodes an extension of any bad thing M 2 M:
K , ftk j :(9M 2 Obs : M 2 M ^ zipk(M)  tk)g;
37In this case, the ti have ﬁnite and potentially differing length. So if j > jtij, let ti[j] = ? for some
new state ? = 2 . Thus, zipk(T) is a trace over state space ( [ ?)k. We redeﬁne trace preﬁx  over this
space to ignore ?: let t  t0 iff, for some t00 that is a trace over , dte = dt0et00, where dte is the truncation
of t that removes any ? states. For notational simplicity, we omit this technicality in the remainder of the
proof.
44where tk denotes a trace t over space k.
To see that K is safety, suppose that tk = 2 K. Then by the deﬁnition of K, there
must exist some M 2 M such that zipk(M)  tk. Consider any trace uk  zipk(M).
By the deﬁnition of K, we have that uk = 2 K. Thus, for any trace tk not in K, there is
some ﬁnite bad thing zipk(M), such that no extension uk of the bad thing is in K. By
deﬁnition, K is therefore safety.
Finally, we need to show that S satisﬁes K exactly when Sk satisﬁes K. We do so
by mutual implication.
()) SupposeS j= K. Then, bydeﬁnition, S 2 K. Forsake ofcontradiction, suppose
that Sk 6 K. Then, by the deﬁnition of subset, there exists some tk 2 Sk such
that tk = 2 K. Let T be unzipk(tk). By the deﬁnition of K, there must exist some
M 2 M such that zipk(M)  tk. Applying unzipk() to this predicate, and
noting that unzip is monotonic with respect to , we obtain M  unzipk(tk).
By the deﬁnition of T, we then have that M  T. By the construction of M, T
therefore cannot be in K. By the construction of Sk and the deﬁnition of T, each
trace in T must also be a trace of S. So by deﬁnition, T  S. By transitivity, we
have that M  S. By the construction of M, S then cannot be in K. But this
contradicts the fact that S 2 K. Therefore, Sk  K, so by deﬁnition Sk j= K.
(() Suppose Sk j= K. Then, by deﬁnition, Sk  K. Suppose, for sake of con-
tradiction, that S does not satisfy K. Then, by deﬁnition, S = 2 K. Since K is
k-safety, this means that there exists an M  S, where jMj  k, such that for
all T0  M, T0 = 2 K. Let mk be zipk(M), and let sk be a trace of Sk such
that mk  sk (such a trace must exist since M  S). By the construction of K,
for any tk  mk, we have that tk = 2 K. Therefore, sk = 2 K, and it follows that
Sk 6 K. But this contradicts the fact that Sk  K. Therefore, S 2 K, so by
deﬁnition S j= K.
Proposition 2. (8L 2 Prop : L 2 LP () [L] 2 LHP)
Proof. By mutual implication.
()) Let L be an arbitrary liveness property. We want to show that [L] is a liveness
hyperproperty—that is, any observation M can be extended to a trace property T
that is contained in [L]. So let M be an arbitrary observation. By the deﬁnition of
liveness, for each m 2 M, there exists some t  m such that t 2 L. For a given
m, let that trace t be denoted tm. Construct the set T =
S
m2Mftmg. Since all
the tm are elements of L, we have T  L. By the deﬁnition of lifting, it follows
that T is contained in [L]. Further, T extends M by the construction of T. Thus,
T satisﬁes the requirements of the trace property we needed to construct. By
deﬁnition, [L] is hyperliveness.
(() Let L be an arbitrary property such that [L] is hyperliveness. We want to show
that L is liveness. So consider an arbitrary trace t, and let T = ftg. Since [L]
is hyperliveness, we have that there exists a T0 such that T  T0 and T0 2 [L].
Since T  T0 and T = ftg, there exists a t0 such that t  t0 and t0 2 T0, by the
45deﬁnition of . By the deﬁnition of lifting, if t0 2 T0 2 [L], then it must be the
case that t0 2 L. Thus, for any t, there exists a t0 such that t  t0 and t0 2 L.
Therefore, L is liveness, by deﬁnition.
Theorem 3. PIF  LHP
Proof. Let P be an arbitrary possibilistic information-ﬂow hyperproperty, and let ClP
be the closure operator that Mantel [37] would associate with P.38 Then, by Mantel’s
Deﬁnition 10, it must be the case that P = fClP(T) j T 2 Propg. Closure operators
must satisfy the axiom (8X : X  Cl(X)), which we use below.
To show that P is hyperliveness, let T 2 Obs be arbitrary. By the deﬁnition of
hyperliveness, we need to show that there exists a T0 2 Prop such that T  T0 and
T0 2 P. Let T0 be ClP(^ T), where ^ T denotes the embedding of T into Prop by in-
ﬁnitely stuttering the ﬁnal state of each trace in T, as discussed in section 2. By the
closure axiom above, we have that ^ T  ClP(^ T). So by the deﬁnition of , we can
conclude T  ClP(^ T) = T0. Further, T0 must be an element of P since it is the ClP-
closure of trace property ^ T. Therefore, T0 satisﬁes the required conditions, and P is
hyperliveness.
To see that the subset relation is strict, consider liveness property GS (guaranteed
service) from section 2. It corresponds to liveness hyperproperty [GS], but has no
corresponding closure operator. For suppose that such a closure operator did exist,
and consider an inﬁnite trace t in which service fails to occur. The closure of any set
containing t must still contain t, by the axiom above. But then the closure does not




Proof. By mutual containment.
() By deﬁnition, the elements of O
B are ﬁnite intersections of elements of O
SB.
Thus, every element of O
SB is already trivially an element of O
B.
() Let N be an arbitrary element of O
B. By the deﬁnition of a base, we can write N
as
T
i "Mi, where i ranges over a ﬁnite index set and each Mi is an observation.
We want to show that there exists an element " N of O
SB such that N =" N.
So consider N. Every trace property T in it must extend every Mi. Thus, by the
deﬁnition of , every such trace property T extends
S
i Mi. Therefore N =" S
i Mi. Our desired observation N is thus
S
i Mi. Note that, for N to be a valid
observation, it must be a ﬁnite set. The union over Mi must therefore result in a
ﬁnite set—which it does, since i ranges over a ﬁnite index set.
38Moreprecisely, Mantelarguesthatevery“possibilisticinformation-ﬂowproperty[sic]”canbeexpressed
as a basic security predicate, and that each basic security predicate induces a set of closure operators. Any
element of this set sufﬁces to instantiate ClP. Also, Mantel’s closure operators were over ﬁnite traces, and
we have generalized to inﬁnite traces.
46Proposition 4. SHP = C
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Let S be an arbitrary safety hyperproperty. We need to show that it is also a
closed set. By the deﬁnition of closed, this is equivalent to showing that S is the
complement of an open set. Our strategy is to construct hyperproperty O, show
that O and S are equal, and show that O is open.
By the deﬁnition of hypersafety, we have that any trace property T that is not
a member of S—and thus is a member of S—must contain some bad thing.
Consider the set M 2 P(Obs) of all bad things for S. M contains one or more
elements for every trace property in S:
M , fM 2 Obs j (9T 2 S : M  T
^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 2 S))g:
Next, deﬁne O as the completion of M—that is, the set of all trace properties





= fT j (9M 2 M : M  T)g; (D.1)
where the equality follows by the deﬁnition of "M. Since each such trace prop-
erty T violates S, we would suspect that O is the complement of S. This is
indeed the case:
Claim. O = S
Proof. (By mutual containment.)
() Suppose T 2 O. Then by equation D.1, there is some M 2 M
such that M  T. By the deﬁnition of M, any extension of M
is an element of S. Since T is such an extension, T 2 S.
() Suppose T 2 S. Then T = 2 S, so by the deﬁnition of hypersafety,
(9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2
S)). Consider that M. It must be a member of M, by deﬁnition.
Since M  T, we have that T 2 O by equation D.1.
AllthatremainsistoshowthatO isopen. First, notethat"M, foranyM 2 Obs,
is by deﬁnition an element of O
SB. Thus each of the sets "M in the deﬁnition
of O is open. Second, by the deﬁnition of open sets, a union of open sets is open.
O is such a union, and is therefore open.
() Let C be an arbitrary closed set. We need to show that it is also hypersafety. Our
strategy is to identify, for any trace property T not in C, a bad thing for T. If
such a bad thing exists for all T, then C is by deﬁnition hypersafety.
47Since C is closed, it is by deﬁnition the complement of an open set. By Proposi-





where each Mi is an observation.
Let T be an arbitrary trace property such that T = 2 C, or equivalently, such that
T 2 C. Then T must be in at least one of the inﬁnite unions in equation D.2.
Thus, there must exist an i such that
T 2 "Mi and Mi = fU 2 Prop j Mi  Ug; (D.3)
where the equality follows from the deﬁnition of ".
We construct the bad thing M for T by deﬁning:
M , Mi:
We have that M  T, because of equation D.3.
To show that M is a bad thing for T, consider any T0  M. By the deﬁnition of
M, T0  Mi. By equation D.3, it follows that T0, like T, is a member of "Mi.
By equation D.2, T0 2 C. Therefore, T0 = 2 C.
We have now shown that for any T = 2 C, there exists an M  T, such that for
all T0  M, T0 = 2 C. Thus C is hypersafety, by deﬁnition.
Proposition 5. LHP = D
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Let L be an arbitrary liveness hyperproperty. We need to show that L is dense.
By the deﬁnition of dense, we must therefore show that L intersects every non-
empty open set. So let O be an arbitrary non-empty open set. We need to show
that L \ O is non-empty. By Proposition 3 and the deﬁnition of open, we can
write O as
S
i "Mi. Consider an arbitrary Mi. Since L is hyperliveness, there
exists a T  Mi such that T 2 L. Further, by the deﬁnition of ", we have that
T 2 O. Therefore, T 2 L \ O, and it follows that L is dense, by deﬁnition.
() Let D be an arbitrary dense set. To show that D is hyperliveness, we must show
that any observation T can be extended to a trace property T0 contained in D—
that is, (8T 2 Obs : (9T0 2 Prop : T  T0 ^ T0 2 D)). So let T be an
arbitrary observation. Let OT be the completion of T:
OT , "T
= fT0 2 Prop j T  T0g (D.4)
OT is an element of O
SB, the subbase of our topology, by deﬁnition. Thus,
by the deﬁnition of a subbase, OT is an open set. By the deﬁnition of a dense
48set (which is that a dense set intersects every open set), we therefore have that
OT \ D 6= ;. Let T0 be any element in the set OT \ D. By equation D.4, we
have T  T0.
We have now shown that, for an arbitrary observation T, there exists a trace
property T0 such that T  T0 and T0 2 D. Therefore, D is hyperliveness, by
deﬁnition.
Theorem 4. O = VL(O)
Proof. By mutual containment.
() Suppose O 2 O. By the deﬁnitions of a base and of O, we can write O
as
S1
i " Mi, where each Mi is an element of Obs.39 Now we calculate:
S1
i "Mi
= h deﬁnition of "i
S1
i fT j T  Mig
= h deﬁnition of  i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi : (9t 2 T : mij  t))g
= h deﬁnition of "i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi :"mij \ T 6= ;)g
= h deﬁnition of hi i
S1
i fT j (8 mij 2 Mi : T 2 h"miji)g





Since "mij 2 OB by deﬁnition, and OB  O by the deﬁnition of base, we have
that h"miji 2 VSB





VL(O). Therefore, by the calculation above, we can conclude O 2 VL(O).














jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g
Since Oij is open in the base topology O, it can be rewritten a union of base
39We decorate quantiﬁers with 1 and  to denote an inﬁnite and ﬁnite range, respectively.










jfT j T \ (
S1
k "tijk) 6= ;g
= h set theory i
S1
i fT j (8 j : (91 k : T \ "tijk 6= ;))g
= h deﬁnition  i
S1
i fT j (8 j : (91 k : ftijkg  T))g




j tijk0  Tg




i fT j Mi  Tg
= h deﬁnition of "i
S1
i "Mi
Finally, since Mi is a ﬁnite set of ﬁnite traces, it is an element of Obs. So by
deﬁnition, " Mi 2 O
SB. Thus by the deﬁnition of base,
S1
i " Mi 2 O.
Therefore, by the calculation above, we can conclude O 2 O.
Proposition 6. SHP = ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg)
Proof. Let S be an arbitrary safety hyperproperty. By Proposition 4, S is a closed set
in topology O. By Theorem 4, S is thus also a closed set in topology VL(O). By the
deﬁnition of closed, S is the complement of an open set in topology VL(O). By the
deﬁnition of a base, we can thus write S as unions of intersections of base elements.
Letting  denote set complement, we calculate:
S









jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g





jfT j T \ Oij 6= ;g





jfT j T \ Oij = ;g





jfT j T  Oijg













Since each Oij is open in topology O, we have that Oij is closed in O. By the fact that
closed sets in O correspond to safety properties [4], Oij is a safety property. Therefore,
S is the inﬁnite intersection of ﬁnite unions of safety properties, and by deﬁnition of
ClC must be an element of ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg).
Similarly, given an arbitrary element of ClC(f[S] j S 2 SPg), the same reason-
ing used above establishes that it is also an element of SHP. Therefore, by mutual
containment, the two sets are equal.
Theorem 5. (8P 2 HP : (9S 2 SHP;L 2 LHP : P = S \ L))
Proof. This theorem can be easily proved by adapting either the logical [53] or topo-
logical [4] proof of the intersection theorem for trace properties. The domains involved
are merely upgraded to include an additional level of sets. Here we take the former
approach and rehearse the logical proof.
Our strategy is as follows. Given hyperproperty P, we construct safety hyperpro-
perty S that contains P as a subset. We also construct liveness hyperproperty L that
contains P. The intersection of S and L then necessarily contains P, and we shall
show that the intersection is, in fact, exactly P.
To construct S, we deﬁne the safety hyperproperty Safe(P), which stipulates that
the hyperliveness of P is never violated. A bad thing for this safety hyperproperty is
any set of traces that cannot be extended to satisfy P. So we require that Safe(P)
contains only sets T of traces such that any observation of T can be extended to satisfy
P. Formally,
Safe(P) , fT 2 Prop j (8M 2 Obs : M  T
=) (9T0 2 Prop : M  T0 ^ T0 2 P))g:
51ItisstraightforwardtoestablishthatSafe(P)ishypersafety: AnysetT notcontainedin
Safe(P) must satisfy the negation of the predicate in the above deﬁnition of Safe(P)—
that is, (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 P)). If no
extension of M can be in P, then no extension T0 of M can be in Safe(P) because the
hyperliveness of P would be violated in T0 at observation M. So
(8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 P)
=) (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =) T0 = 2 Safe(P)): (D.5)
Thus, by monotonicity, (9M 2 Obs : M  T ^ (8T0 2 Prop : M  T0 =)
T0 = 2 Safe(P))). Therefore Safe(P) is hypersafety.
Similarly, to construct L, we deﬁne the liveness hyperproperty Live(P), which
stipulates that it is always possible either to satisfy P or to become impossible, due
to some bad thing, to satisfy P. In the latter case, a safety hyperproperty has been
violated—namely, Safe(P). Formally,
Live(P) , P [ Safe(P);
where H denotes the complement of hyperproperty H with respect to Prop. To show
that Live(P) is hyperliveness, consider any observation T. Suppose that T can be
extended to some trace property T0 such that T0 2 P. Then T0 is also in Live(P), so
Live(P)ishyperlivenessforT. Ontheotherhand, ifT cannotbeextendedtosatisfyP,
then T is a bad thing for Safe(P)—that is, (8T0 2 Prop : T  T0 =) T0 = 2 P). Let
T0 be an arbitrary extension of T. By the same reasoning as equation (D.5), T0 is not
in Safe(P). Therefore T0 must be in Safe(P). Thus, Live(P) is again hyperliveness
for T. We conclude that Live(P) is hyperliveness.
Next, note that P  Safe(P), because any element T of P satisﬁes the deﬁnition of
Safe(P). In particular, for any M  T, there is a T0  M such that T0 2 P—namely,
T0 = T. Thus, Safe(P) = P [ Safe(P).
Finally, let S = Safe(P) and L = Live(P), and we prove the theorem by simple
set manipulation:
S \ L = Safe(P) \ Live(P)
= (P [ Safe(P)) \ (P [ Safe(P))
= P \ (Safe(P) [ Safe(P))
= P \ Prop
= P
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